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INTRODUCTION
Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market
power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would in
crease social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket sec
ond-best tradeoffs.1 The lesson of second-best analysis is that one
market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market
failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable
that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive
may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of
maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an anti
trust judge come to the same result under a defensible application (or
extension) of existing legal doctrine? This question highlights the ten
sions between an antitrust policy dedicated to preserving "competi
tion" and an antitrust policy dedicated to maximizing total welfare. In
doing so, the question tests the theoretical and practical limits of anti
trust law,2 asking whether it is time for antitrust law to move beyond
structural understandings of competition and into the realm of express
welfare analysis.3

1. This Article distinguishes intramarket second-best tradeoffs { tradeoffs involving mul·
tiple market failures in a single economic market) from intermarket second-best tradeoffs
(tradeoffs involving multiple market failures in distinct economic markets). The proposed
antitrust defense is limited to intramarket concerns largely for practical reasons. Intramar·
ket concerns can be evaluated within a partial equilibrium economic framework, while many
intermarket second-best tradeoffs cannot., The general theory of second best, however,
teaches that intermarket second-best concerns can undermine intramarket second-best as
sessments. I defend the viability of antitrust law policing intramarket tradeoffs while ignor
ing intermarket tradeoffs on two grounds. First, a market definition process that strives to
incorporate strong economic interrelationships should capture the second-best concerns of
primary significance. Second, it is a defensible institutional division of labor to assign anti
trust courts the task of policing intramarket tradeoffs, while assigning Congress the role of
policing intermarket second-best concerns. For a further discussion of these justifications,
see infra notes15-18and187-190 and accompanying text.
2. The theoretical challenge is to antitrust law's goals and its operative methodology.
The practical challenge is to the institutional capacity of courts, testing whether it is possible
to devise a claint that could be adjudicated at acceptable administrative and error costs. As
such, intramarket second-best tradeoffs test the limits of antitrust law and help reassess the
proper relationship between antitrust law and antitrust economics. See, e.g., Derek C. Bok,
Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act and the Merging ofLaw and Economics, 14 HARV. L. REV. 226
{1960); Oliver E. Williamson, A/locative Efficiency and the Limits ofAntitrust, 59 AM. ECON.
REV.105 {1969); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TExAS L. REV. 1 {1984).
3. "Competition" is a wonderfully ill-defined term - "anticompetitive" even more so.
Most courts adopt some model or implicit understanding of what "competition" means and
proceed to define "anticompetitive" as conduct that is inconsistent with their structural un
derstanding. The weaknesses of this approach, and the comparative strengths of total wel
fare as an organizing principle for antitrust law, is one theme of this Article. I use the terms
total welfare, welfare-enhancing, and efficiency to signify roughly interchangeable concepts.
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This Article argues (1) that antitrust law should recognize a de
fense for private acts that restrain "competition" under the traditional
antitrust analysis but advance total welfare, (2) that courts are compe
tent to administer this defense, and (3) that the framework of existing
antitrust statutes permits courts to recognize this defense. Today,
most judges and scholars would reject intramarket second-best argu
ments as a justification for otherwise impermissible acts that enhance
or maintain private market power, regardless of the credibility of the
underlying economic analysis. The reasons given for rejecting such
claims, however, would vary with the commentator. Some would ar
gue that intramarket second-best claims have no statutory basis. Oth
ers would argue that maximizing total welfare is not the goal of the
antitrust laws. Still others, who might be sympathetic to an efficiency
oriented antitrust doctrine, would be skeptical of the ability of the
courts to implement a total welfare standard.
This Article challenges such received wisdom. Part I examines the
theory of intramarket second-best analysis and explores how it fits
within contemporary antitrust scholarship. Analytically, a defense for
second-best tradeoffs has much in common with Oliver Williamson's
productive efficiency defense in merger cases and with various market
failure defenses that have been advanced in the literature. These
similarities are examined, and the parameters of an affirmative de
fense are outlined.
I suggest that to rebut a finding of illegality based upon a tradi
tional presumption of anticompetitive effects, defendants should have
to establish (1) that the challenged conduct is responsive to an identi
fiable market failure; (2) that the conduct produces a net increase in
total welfare (static efficiency); (3) that the conduct will not substan
tially impair subsequent efforts to address the underlying market fail
ure (dynamic efficiency); and (4) that there is not a less restrictive
course of action consistent with the antitrust laws that could achieve
the same static efficiency gain. This defense presupposes a total wel
fare standard of analysis.
Part II examines the technical viability of the affirmative defense.
Section II.A outlines the theoretical basis of consumer surplus and ex
plores the tools underlying economic welfare analysis. Section II.B
advances two contentions. First, the economic tools underlying many
In contrast, antitrust courts often speak of balancing procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects. In some cases, these approaches overlap, and a court that is balancing pro- and anti
competitive effects is implicitly engaging in total welfare analysis. I argue that it would be a
natural evolutionary step for courts to move beyond structural understandings and the
rhetoric of procompetitive effects, and to engage expressly in welfare analysis. Moreover,
taking this step need not involve a radical departure from existing doctrine, because second
best concerns and welfare analysis can be layered over existing competition-based antitrust
presumptions, which are often effective proxies for economic efficiency. Differences will
arise only when economic theory and empirical evidence call these presumptions into ques
tion.
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intramarket second-best claims are sufficiently advanced to permit
parties to explore such claims in the context of litigation. Second, the
logic underlying a total welfare approach can be made intuitively ac
cessible to judges, lawyers, and jurors. Indeed, a total welfare stan
dard may actually provide better criteria for drafting jury instructions
and counseling clients than an antitrust standard based on protecting
"competition." Section II.C assesses the costs and benefits of imple
menting an intramarket second-best defense and examines how the
doctrine can be defined to balance expected type one and type two er
rors.
Part III explores whether second-best tradeoffs and the total wel
fare standard underlying them can be reconciled with contemporary
understandings of antitrust law and the institutional role of the courts.
I argue that antitrust law is best understood in terms of an ongoing
partnership between Congress and the courts. The reality of this part
nership has important implications for statutory interpretation. While
I disagree with scholars like Robert Bork, who claim that a total wel
fare standard is mandated by the antitrust statutes, I maintain that
such an approach lies within the realm of acceptable evolutionary
paths of judge-made antitrust doctrine. Consequently, the case for
second-best analysis should be won or lost on the strength of its nor
mative and policy justifications. I argue that a narrowly tailored af
firmative defense restricted to intramarket tradeoffs creates an appro
priate division of labor between Congress and the courts, and that a
total welfare standard can be reconciled with the institutional role of
the judiciary.
This Article presents only a skeletal outline of the second-best de
fense. Its purpose is to make it intellectually respectable to argue for
the defense, not to demonstrate that in fact it should be allowed in any
particular case. The examples that are provided suggest the kinds of
seeming restraints that may deserve legitimation under this analysis,
but to actually argue for these restraints in real cases would require
more case-specific data and nuanced analysis. Only after courts and
litigants have wrestled with second-best defenses in at least several
real cases can the workability of the theoretical case I make here be
fully evaluated. Broad abstract description, and an expression of faith
in the combined capacities of courts and economists, only gets us
started. Indeed, the best starting point may be to encourage enforce
ment officials to take second-best considerations into account in de
ciding whether to challenge particular restraints. This would permit
the gradual accumulation of experience, which, if the decisions are in
corporated in policy statements or made objects of study, may inform
courts when they face intramarket second-best claims in litigation.
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TOTAL WELFARE, MARKET FAILURES, AND lNTRAMARKET
SECOND-BEST CLAIMS: TowARD DEFINING AN
ANTITRUST DEFENSE

A. Market Failures and the General Theory of Second Best
According to the first theorem of welfare economics,4 competitive
equilibria are Pareto-efficient, meaning that there exists no realloca
tion of resources that could make someone better off without making
someone else worse off.5 This is a statement about the economy as a
whole (general equilibrium), and envisions that when all industries
and markets are competitive, the interaction between them will yield
an efficient outcome. Economic proofs of the existence and efficiency
of general competitive equilibria entail many restrictive assumptions.
Some of these are: buyers and sellers act independently rather than
collusively, resources are perfectly mobile and fungible, there are no
production or consumption externalities, buyers know all relevant
prices and qualities, and sellers know all production possibilities.6 If
any of these assumptions fail in any market, then the efficiency of the
resulting general equilibrium (if one exists) can no longer be asserted.
If one condition fails in one market, then the policy prescription is
straightforward: remedy the isolated failure, and the result will be a
"first-best" solution. If there are multiple failures in a single market,
or multiple failures in multiple markets, the analysis becomes more
complicated. As Lipsey and Lancaster demonstrated in their analysis
of the "general theory of second best," the efficiency of competitive
equilibria is an all-or-nothing proposition.7 Unless all conditions can
4. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS:
29.7 {1987) {discussing the first welfare theorem).

A MODERN APPROACH §

5. For discussions of Pareto-efficiency, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 153-56 {1990); VARIAN, supra note 4, §§ 17.9, 28.3; HAL R.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5, 198, 203 (2d ed. 1984).
6. For discussions of general equilibrium theory and its assumptions see KREPS, supra
note 5, at 199-205; VARIAN, supra note 4, § 28.8, 28.12; VARIAN, supra note 5, at 189-211.
See generally BRYAN ELLICKSON, COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM:
THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS {1993). All economic modeling involves some level of abstraction and the

making of assumptions. The assumptions need not be descriptively accurate for the model
to produce meaningful insights. The failure of particular assumptions, however, can appro
priately call the validity of the entire model into question.
7.

See

R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster,

The General Theory of Second Best,

63 REV.

ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956) {"The general theorem for the second best optimum states that if
there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attain
ment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paratian conditions, although still attain
able, are, in general, no longer desirable."); see also C.E. FERGUSON, A MACROECONOMIC
THEORY OF WORKABLE COMPETITION 15-17, 49-50 (1964) (discussing origins of second
best theory and implications of second-best considerations for theories of workable competi
tion); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 93, at 301 n.l (5th ed. 1998)
(providing an example of how second-best problems can undermine traditional efficiency
analysis); CATIIERINE M. PRICE, WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 31-42
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be satisfied in all markets, there is no guarantee that remedying sepa
rate market failures will improve efficiency. Indeed, the counterintui
tive proposition that remedying isolated market failures could actually
make outcomes worse becomes possible:
From this theorem there follows the important negative corollary that
there is no a priori way to judge as between various situations in which
some of the Paretian optimum conditions are fulfilled while others are
not. Specifically, it is not true that a situation in which more, but not all,
of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely to
be, superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled.8

These insights can easily be leveraged into a full-scale attack on
"piecemeal welfare economics."9 Richard Markovits has explored
many of the implications of second-best theory for law and econom
ics.10 In particular, Markovits has criticized courts and scholars for
failing to appreciate the implications of second-best theory for con
temporary antitrust doctrine.11
Antitrust scholars have reacted to the general theory of second
best either by dismissing its implications entirely, or by using its in
sights to invalidate economic approaches to antitrust altogether. Both
responses are misguided. Many economically oriented scholars ac
knowledge second-best problems but nevertheless reject their implica
tions. A range of justifications is provided: some contend that incor
porating second-best concerns would be too complicated for courts to
handle, others argue that a simple heuristic of promoting competition
on a serial basis will lead to the most defensible results, and others

(1977) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the theory of second best); MICHAEL
5 (1984) (discussing the general theory of
second best and its implications for welfare economics); C.G. Veljanovski, The New Law·
and-Economics: A Research Review, in READINGS IN TiiE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND
REGULATION 21-22 (A.I. Ogus & C.G. Veljanovski eds., 1984) (same).

WATERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY OF INDUSTRY

8. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 7, at 11-12.
9.

Id.

at 17.

10.

See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting from a "Negli·
gence" System to a "Strict Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A
Partial and Preliminary Third-Best Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11
(1998); Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our
Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique ofthe Chicago Approach
to the Study ofLaw and Economics, 1975 WIS. L REV. 950; Richard S. Markovits, The Lim
its to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TExAS L. REV. 41 (1984)
[hereinafter Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust]; Richard S. Markovits, Monop·
oly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our
Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some There/ores, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
313 (1996); Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and the Antitrust
Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1979) [hereinafter Markovits, Second
Best, and the Antitrust Paradox]; Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law &
Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1998).
11. See Markovits,
Markovits, Second Best,

The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust, supra note
and the Antitrust Paradox, supra note 10, at 577-80.

10, at 45-48;

February 2000]

Antitrust Beyond Competition

855

maintain that second-best problems must be ignored because Con
gress has established a legislative policy favoring competition.12
Scholars who are less sympathetic to an economically oriented anti
trust law have employed second-best theory to undermine efficiency
as a normative antitrust benchmark and to bolster the case for fairness
or distributive justice as alternative guiding principles for antitrust
law.13
We can better understand these issues if we distinguish general
from partial equilibrium economic analysis, and intermarket from in
tramarket second-best concerns. General equilibrium analysis exam
ines the simultaneous interaction of all markets in the economy.
Maintaining an antitrust policy premised on such a framework is not
practical. In this respect, the received antitrust wisdom is correct considering the effects of market distortions elsewhere in the economy
(intermarket second-best concerns) requires such wide-ranging
knowledge of conditions throughout the economy and the way they
would respond to changes in particular sectors, that parties could not
accurately canvass them nor courts evaluate the complex implications
of granting relief. Entirely different questions are raised, however, if
we ask whether antitrust law should incorporate the effects of intra
market second-best claims in the context of partial equilibrium analy
sis. In their haste to reject intermarket second-best concerns, antitrust
scholars have failed to appreciate the potential significance of intra
market second-best concerns.14

12 See ROBERT H. BORK, nm ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITil
ITSELF 113-14 (1993) (rejecting second-best claims because of the inability of the judiciary to
engage in the necessary economic analysis and because of a legislative policy in favor of
competition); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: nm LAW OF COM
PETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 38-39 (1994) (rejecting the general theory of second best as
being "extraordinarily complex" and inlpractical); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust After
Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 241-42 (1985) ("Problems of second-best may be so over
whelming and so hypothetical that the antitrust policy maker is well off to avoid them."); see
also 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 308-13 (1978) (acknowl
edging second-best concerns both between and within markets, but advocating a general
policy of promoting competition on a serial basis).
13. See Robert G. Harris & Thomas M Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Inte
grated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1984) (arguing that second-best concerns un
dermine efficiency, but not distributive or fairness justifications for antitrust law); Lawrence
A. Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1219-20 (1975) (arguing that the gen
eral theory of second best undermines allocative efficiency as a normative guide for antitrust
law).
14. See Peter J. Hammer, Mergers, Market Power and Competition: An Economic and
Legal Evaluation of Hospital Mergers, at 290 n.137 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Michigan, Dep't of Econ.) (on file with author) ("To the extent that these con
clusions pertain to welfare inlplications between distinct markets from a standpoint of gen
eral equilibrium theory, the literature [advocating the rejection of second-best clainls] is cor
rect To the extent that the second best concerns are raised in the same economic market,
the claims may deserve more serious attention than they have received to date.").
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Partial equilibrium analysis seeks to examine a single well-defined
market in isolation, holding the conditions in other markets constant.15
Here, data problems are often tractible, and current economic tools
provide a means of addressing legitimate second-best concerns while
avoiding the paralysis inherent in the general theory of second best.
Oliver Williamson, responding to Lawrence Sullivan's second-best at
tack on the ability of antitrust courts to rely upon economic princi
ples,16 has defended the legitimacy of employing partial equilibrium
analysis in antitrust disputes.17 Williamson argues that a properly con
structed partial equilibrium framework can partition the economic
analysis in a manner that captures the most significant second-best ef
fects, while properly ignoring remote second-best concerns. "Strong
interaction effects then can be taken expressly into account, and else
where the second-best qualification deserves the weight that lawyers
label 'de minimis.' "18
The arguments Williamson gives to justify partial equilibrium
analysis in antitrust cases militate in favor of expanding antitrust
analysis to accommodate intramarket second-best concerns. Strong
economic interconnections not only can be taken into account, they
should be incorporated into the economic analysis. The theoretical

15. See KREPS, supra note 5, at 27 9 -80 {discussing limitations of partial equilibrium
analysis); POSNER, supra note 7, § 3.2, at 93 (contrasting partial and general equilibrium
analysis); VARIAN, supra note 4, at 4 80 (same); VARIAN, supra note 5, at 3-5 (introducing
concept of equilibrium and the framework of partial equilibrium analysis). Obviously, con
ditions in all other markets will not remain constant. Changes in one market can have ripple
effects in others. Similarly, changes elsewhere in the economy can influence the market be
ing examined. If these economic interconnections are strong, the partial equilibrium frame
work should be defined to incorporate them into the analysis. If the interconnections are
not strong, then one can often ignore such second-order effects without undermining the
validity of the analysis.
16. See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 1220 {"Absent the simultaneous fulfillment of all con
ditions of optimum allocation ... economic theory tells us nothing about how to improve
resource allocation.... Economics simply provides no basis on which to say, for example,
that ending monopoly in the shoe industry or ending a price cartel in the electrical equip
ment industry (or doing both of these things) will improve resource allocations and increase
aggregate welfare. Given the persistence of other deviations (other monopolies, cartels, tar
iffs, and distorting taxes), there is no basis for assuming that doing away with any one or
more deviations from optimality will improve efficiency at all.").
17. See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restraints: Antitrust Ramifica
tions of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 95 3, 98 6-8 8 {1977) (rejecting
Sullivan's critique of antitrust efficiency analysis and defending the ability of partial equilib
rium analysis to evaluate antitrust issues).
18. Id. at 987. There is an unstated assumption in Williamson's argument. A properly
framed partial equilibrium analysis may be able to partition the economy in a manner that
accommodates strong economic interconnections, while ignoring remote second-best conse
quences, but the economist's concept of "partitioning" the economy must be mapped onto
the antitrust concept of defining the relevant market. To bridge this gap, courts should at
tempt to define antitrust markets in a manner that corresponds with a defensible partial
equilibrium analysis. If they do so, then it is meaningful to distinguish between intramarket
and intermarket second-best problems, and to construct an antitrust defense that addresses
the former while defensibly ignoring the latter.
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and practical justifications relied upon to reject general second-best
theory and intermarket second-best concerns do not apply to intra
market second-best problems. Indeed, whether they acknowledge it
or not, antitrust courts and scholars engage in partial equilibrium
analysis all the time, implicitly ignoring the general second-best impli
cations of their analysis. From this perspective, my proposal is rela
tively uncontroversial: the same tools that antitrust courts currently
use to examine a full range of economic activity should also be used to
examine a range of intramarket second-best concerns as well.19
What then does partial equilibrium analysis look like and what
does it seek to accomplish? Within this economic framework, the
judge or decisionmaker is concerned about the effect that market
changes will have on total welfare, with total welfare defined as the
sum of producer and consumer surplus (see figure 1).20

19. The dilemma is actually fairly sharp. Either the tools of partial equilibrium analysis
are robust enough to address ordinary antitrust disputes, in which case they are robust
enough to address the implications of intramarket second-best tradeoffs, or the economic
tools of partial equilibrium analysis are not robust enough to assess the implications of in
tramarket second-best tradeoffs, in which case their ability to assess the economic conse
quences of a wide range of traditional antitrust disputes must also be called into question.
Obviously, one can raise concerns about the ability of courts to implement the theory in
practice, or whether such an analysis is consistent with the antitrust statutes, issues that are
addressed infra Parts II and ill, respectively; but so long as one is willing to conceed the
propriety of adopting a partial equilibrium framework in antitrust cases, it is difficult to sim
ply ignore the problems raised by intramarket second-best concerns.
20. Simplistically, profits can be thought of as the area between the upward sloping sup
ply curve and the market price for the product (see figure 1). The concept of consumer sur
plus can be made graphically concrete by envisioning the area between the downward slop
ing market demand curve for Product A and the price for Product A (see figure 1). A
technically more accurate definition of consumer surplus is provided infra notes 111-114 and
accompanying text. For a basic introduction to the concept of consumer and producer sur
plus, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 4-5, and VARIAN, supra note 4, §§ 15.1, 15.11.
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Producer surplus is a measure of producer profits. Consumer sur
plus is the aggregation of the differences between all consumers' indi
vidual reservation prices (how much they would be willing to pay for
Product A) and the market price (how much they have to pay for
Product A),21 where "consumers " are defined as actual purchasers of
Product A and those who would have purchased Product A if the
price had been lower.22 Conceptually, a rational antitrust policy could
21. This Article employs the terminology of traditional economic analysis: total welfare,
consumer surplus, and producer surplus. Substantial confusion exists in the antitrust litera
ture because of Judge Bork's idiosyncratic use of the term "consumer welfare." See Robert
H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7-16 (1966)
(defining consumer welfare implicitly in terms of total welfare); Boru<, supra note 12, at 9091 (defining consumer welfare in terms of maximizing productive and allocative efficiency total welfare). Joseph Brodley has rightly declared that "consumer welfare is the most
abused term in modem welfare analysis." Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals ofAnti
trust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020,
1032 (1987). The economist's "total welfare" and Judge Bork's "consumer welfare" are
functionally equivalent. See John R. Morris, International Trade and Antitrust: Comments,
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 945, 945-46 n.4 (1993). Although I disagree with Bork's choice of words,
I am generally sympathetic to the contention that antitrust law should strive to maximize
total welfare.
22. This common sense understanding of consumers contrasts sharply with that of Judge
Bork's. Bork defines "consumers" to include the owners of firms and monopolies. See
Boru<, supra note 12, at 108-10. Understandably, if "producers" are also "consumers," then
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be designed to maximize either total welfare or consumer surplus.23
The choice of which to maximize, as we shall see, can have important
ramifications for antitrust policy.
The basic tools of partial equilibrium analysis provide a reasonable
framework in which to examine the effects of intramarket second-best
tradeoffs. Still, a number of important questions persist. While the
theoretical and pragmatic arguments antitrust scholars give to justify
ignoring intermarket second-best claims are not persuasive when ap
plied to intramarket second-best claims, can a theory of intramarket
second best be designed that courts are capable of implementing?
Does the antitrust laws' commitment to "competition" preclude con
sidering intramarket second-best tradeoffs in cases where the goals of
competition and total welfare conflict? Before attempting to answer
these questions, it is useful to gain a better understanding of exactly
what an analysis of intramarket second-best tradeoffs would entail.
B.

Illustrations ofIntramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs

A variety of intramarket second-best tradeoffs are possible. I be
gin with the example of allowing a concentration of market power to
counteract negative externalities. Although problems of negative ex
ternalities might better be addressed by taxes or regulation, they are
an easily understood example of intramarket second-best tradeoffs. I

"consumer welfare" must be equal the sum of producer and consumer surpluses (the
economist's definition of total welfare).

23. Robert Lande is the leading proponent of the consumer surplus standard, although
he phrases his theory in terms of avoiding "wealth transfers." See Robert H. Lande, Wealth

Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982) [hereinafter Lande, Wealth Transfers]. A standard
preventing wealth transfers creates a property right, giving consumers an entitlement to the
difference between their reservation price and the competitive market price. See Alan A.
Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777, 787 n.31 (1989);
Robert H. Lande, Commentary: Implications of Professor Scherer's Research for the Future
ofAntitrust, 29 WASHBURN LJ. 256, 260 (1990). Not surprisingly, a total welfare and a con
sumer surplus standard will often produce different antitrust results. See Peter J. Hammer,

Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-Price Competition in Hos
pital Markets, 33 MICH. J.L. REF. (forthcoming 1999) (classifying mergers in terms of their
differential effects on total, producer, and consumer surpluses and exploring the difference
between a total welfare and a consumer surplus standard). For example, a consumer surplus
standard would substantially redefine the contours of Oliver Williamson's productive effi
ciency defense. See infra Section I.C.1. Increases in productive efficiency (cost reductions)
could still be a defense to a merger, but the cost reductions must be so large that they yield
lower post-merger prices. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations
in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1630 (1983). Under this approach, gains in
productive efficiency that would increase total welfare and save social resources, where the
savings were manifested in increased producer profits rather than lower prices, would not be
permitted. Similarly, a consumer surplus rule would not permit intramarket second-best
tradeoffs under the Kaldor-Hicks standard. See discussion infra note 46 and accompanying
text The fact that producers gained more than what consumers lost would not be a suffi
cient warrant for policy action. Any reduction in consumer surplus would constitute a suffi
cient basis for rejecting the challenged practice.
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then present the more plausible case of hospital nonprice competition,
where a merger might curb wasteful forms of competition, such as
providing private parking spaces to physicians or excessive duplication
of services and technology. Finally, I offer examples that illustrate the
breadth of arrangements that may raise second-best concerns.

1.

Negative Extemalities24

Markets are imperfect and often fail.25 In the presence of market
failures, arrangements that might otherwise be considered undesir
able, like the presence of a monopoly, may in fact be welfare
enhancing. The pricing rule characteristic of competitive markets
equates price with private marginal costs. When a negative external
ity, like pollution, exists, private actors fail to internalize the full social
costs of their actions.26 As a result, the competitive price is lower and
the competitive output is higher than is socially desirable.27 The mag
nitude of the resulting allocative inefficiency can be measured by the
shaded triangle in figure 2.

24. Negative externalities represent a lightning rod example that is used primarily for
illustrative purposes. This is not the strongest case in favor of intramarket second-best
analysis in antitrust law, nor the most likely application. The example of externalities, how
ever, is both provocative and easy to grasp. The illustration also accurately suggests the
ramifications (good and bad) of permitting antitrust courts to conduct intramarket second
best tradeoffs. But see Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A
Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 27 5-7 7 {1993) (ad
vocating the adoption of a market failure defense for negative price externalities).
2 5. See ROBERT CoOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45-49 (198 8) {dis
cussing market failures such as monopoly power, externalities, public goods, and imperfect
information).
26. See id. at 169-70 (discussing externalities and possible remedies); PAUL R.
142-44 & fig.7.2 {2d ed.
1 994) (discussing externalities and illustrations of the potential welfare loss); VARIAN, supra
note 5, at 2 5 9- 6 3 (discussing externalities and the range of possible solutions).
27. See FERGUSON & FERGUSON, supra note 26, at 143 fig.7.2 (illustrating the effects of
negative externalities on price and output).

FERGUSON & GLENYS J. FERGUSON, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
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FIGURE TWO: NEGATIVE PRICE EXTERNALITIES
p

Allocative
/Inefficiency

D

Q
For example, assume that two private companies that are polluting
the air merge to attain a monopoly. Their monopoly power allows
them to raise the price of their goods, demand falls, production drops,
and the air becomes cleaner, perhaps at a savings to society that ex
ceed the social costs of the merger. True, a social problem that might
be better curtailed by regulation than by allowing a monopoly does
not make the most appealing case for efficiency-enhancing second
best tradeoffs, but it does illustrate how these can occur. Moreover,
externalities or other inefficiencies are not always obvious targets for
regulatory control, or circumstances may cause regulatory control to
appear less promising than market solutions. Finally, antitrust courts,
which must decide the cases presented to them, may only be able to
increase efficiency by approving such mergers, and doing so does not
preclude later regulation.
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According to second-best theory, one market failure can some
times counteract the effects of another market failure.28 We have just
seen how one market failure, market power, may, in the face of sig
nificant negative externalities, have such a countervailing effect. It
follows that enforcing the ordinary antitrust prescription may produce
an inefficient outcome,29 while allowing the exercise of market power
(either through merger or cartelization) may improve total welfare.
Market power does not, however, ensure that other market failures,
including those involving significant externalities, will be alleviated at
all, much less to an extent that offsets the efficiency costs of the exer
cise of market power. The monopolist's rule of equating marginal
revenue with private marginal costs could lead to an overcorrection
that produces higher prices and lower outputs than are socially opti
mal. Importantly, however, even assuming overcorrection, there is a
range of monopoly pricing where the allocative inefficiency associated
with the monopoly pricing is less than the inefficiency associated with
the negative externality (see figure 2). Any monopoly outcome within
this range would yield an increase in total welfare, as compared to the
competitive market. If antitrust law were guided by a total welfare
standard, then merger or cartelization in this area would not be ruled
out.30
Cigarette smoking provides an illustration.31 Cigarette smoking
imposes a number of external costs. To the extent that health care
costs are paid through the Medicare or Medicaid program, a smoker
fails to internalize all of the economic consequences of smoking
related illnesses. Smokers similarly fail to internalize the harmful ef
fects of second-hand smoke. In a competitive market for cigarettes,

28.

See discussion of the general theory of second best supra Section I.A.

29. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory ofAntitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 713, 751-52 (1986) ("An established and abundant literature has elaborated the condi

tions under which competition enforced by ordinary Sherman Act rules produces ineffi
ciency.").

30. Depending upon how the consumer's price entitlement is defined, a consumer sur
plus standard would not permit these intramarket second-best tradeoffs. Consumer surplus
(at least as defined by the benchmark where the competitive price equals private marginal
cost) would necessarily be reduced in moving from the inefficient competitive level of price
and quantity to any more efficient allocation of resources. If the consumer surplus "entitle
ment" were defined at the socially efficient "price equals marginal social cost" level, then a
consumer surplus standard would permit intramarket second-best tradeoffs in any range in
creasing price from pc to P0 in figure 2, but would not permit any overcorrection by the
would-be monopolist in the P0 to P* range - even though there would be a net increase in
total welfare in this range as compared to the competitive equilibrium.
31. See Ellen Gulbrandsen & Susan Skeath, Would Big Tobacco Have Been Better?:
The Social Welfare Implications of Antitrust Action in the Presence of Negative External
ities, (Wellesley College Working Paper 99-07) (June 1999) (on file with author) (examining
the welfare effects of the 1911 antitrust breakup of the American Tobacco Company and
arguing that a monopoly market structure may have resulted in a higher level of social wel
fare than was produced by the breakup and the introduction of competition).
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price would be equated to private marginal cost, leading to the over
production and overconsumption of cigarettes; that is, there is more
smoking than would exist in a world where all the social costs of the
activity were internalized. In this setting, the exercise of private mar
ket power (either through merger or cartelization) would lead to an
increase in price and a reduction in consumption. That might well in
crease social welfare.32
This does not mean that mergers of cigarette companies should
necessarily be fostered. Comparative institutional analysis must play a
role in implementing the theory of second best.33 Rather than sanc
tioning private market power, the traditional policy response is to in
ternalize the effects of the externality either through a tax34 or through

32. One can imagine many factors that could complicate this simple analysis. The re
sources diverted from the cigarette industry might be used for production and consumption
in a different market that itself may produce pollution or other social harms. The profits
earned by the cigarette monopolist might be directed towards increased advertising and
promotion to further boost cigarette demand and sales. Reduced levels of production may
force small tobacco farmers out of work, or may lead to layoffs of employees at cigarette
factories. Finally, many may think that smoking is inherently objectionable and that smok
ing should not be tolerated at all. Some of these concerns are implicitly addressed in the
economic analysis. If the market is moving from one equilibrium to another, one would not
expect there to be significant gains to promotional advertising that would not have previ
ously been exploited. If the supply curve accurately reflects the social cost of resources, then
directing resources out of the cigarette industry (a market with negative externalities) into
other markets should produce an increase in economic welfare, even if production in alter
native markets results in some negative effects. This being said, the existence of externalities
inside markets and the existence of failures across markets - the very lesson of the general
theory of second best - can directly undermine this assertion. In the end, all an economist
can do is acknowledge these limitations and appeal to the fact that modeling necessarily in
volves some level of abstraction, see supra note 6, that proper partial equilibrium analysis
strives to incorporate strong economic interrelationships, see supra note 15, and that ulti
mately the persuasiveness of the model's conclusions and the economic argument depends
upon the context of its application and the seriousness of the particular objections to its as
sumptions.
Other social values, such as the interests of small tobacco farmers, the interests of ciga
rette factory workers, or the inherent social objections to smoking are not easily reflected in
the economic analysis. This highlights the fact that economic modeling does not obviate the
need to consider the appropriate relationship between economic and non-economic con
cerns in the political process.

33. The existence of federal and state cigarette taxes and potential tort liability compli
cates this simple example. Taxes can be used instead of an antitrust action, and tort liability
can be used instead of or in addition to taxation. The same economic analysis used to con
duct second-best analysis can be used to estimate the optimal level of taxation. Interestingly,
if one looks at the cigarette industry today, the evidence suggests that taxes are substantially
lower than what would be required to internalize the full social costs of smoking. See
Gulbrandsen & Skeath, supra note 31, at 21-22. If this is true, then a story of the failure of
the political process must be told at the same time as the story of the failure of economic
markets. Given the reality of political market failures and the inability to impose appropri
ate taxes, there may be a role for antitrust second-best tradeoffs even in the realm of exter
nalities.
34. See VARIAN, supra note 4, § 31.4 (illustrating the ability of Pigouvian taxes to inter
nalize the effects of externalities and produce socially optimum outcomes).
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the tort system.35 An appropriate tax imposed upon a perfectly com
petitive market could produce the socially efficient outcome without
creating private market power and rewarding businesses that some
would regard as evil. Which approach is superior depends upon the
relative administrative and error costs associated with the different in
stitutional responses. The choice, moreover, need not be dichoto
mous. One can envision concurrent or competing systems of private
second-best solutions and public regulation. Permitting the exercise of
private market power as a second-best remedy will be problematic
only if the solidification of market power would impair the ability of
markets to correct themselves subsequently, or would impede the im
plementation of superior public solutions. In this sense, intramarket
second-best analysis must be sensitive to dynamic as well as static effi
ciency concems.36

2.

Hospital Nonprice Competition

Competition in medical markets raises more complicated second
best claims. In traditionally structured health care markets with per
vasive insurance coverage and passive third-party payors,37 hospital
competition emerged along nonprice rather than price dimensions.38
The welfare effects of nonprice competition are ambiguous. Nonprice
competition has been condemned by some as a medical arms race,39
and praised by others for creating incentives to improve quality and
provide better care to patients, for example, new technology, better
doctors, improved facilities.40
35. See C001ER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 54-66 (examining the ability of negligence
and strict liability tort rules to internalize the costs of accidents and lead to efficient levels of
care).
36. See infra Section I.D for a discussion of dynamic efficiency concerns within the con
text of a proposed affirmative defense for intramarket second-best tradeoffs. This aspect of
the defense examines whether the private "anticompetitive" conduct would increase the
costs of subsequent public or private remedies.
37. See Hammer, supra note 23 (examining the economic structure of traditional health
care markets).
38. See id. (exploring the incentives motivating hospital price and nonprice competi
tion); Peter J. Hammer, Price and Quality Competition in Health Care Markets: The Com
parative Institutional Case Against an Antitrust Exemption for Medical Self Regulation, in
ACHIEVING QUALITY IN MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE OF LAW 131-34 (John D. Blum ed.,
ABA monograph 1997) (same).

39. See, e.g.,

David Dranove et al.,

Is Hospital Competition Wasteful?, 23

ECON. 247, 257-60 (1992) (discussing medical arms race scenario).

RAND J.

40. See, e.g., American Med. Int'!, 104 F.T.C. 1, 185 (1984) ("Because • . . the nonprice
competition that does exist in the industcy responds to consumers' expressions of their wants
by providing services valued by physicians and patients, such as expanding the range of
choices available to them, stimulating innovation, and developing expertise by hospitals, we
conclude that 'rivalry' among hospitals along nonprice dimensions constitutes competition in
the economic sense that warrants protection by the antitrust laws."); United States v.
Rockford Mem'I Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1283-84 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("For similar reasons,
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Models of hospital competition (similar to models of nonprice
competition in the price-regulated airlines industry) demonstrate that
nonprice competition is motivated both by a desire to stimulate aggre
gate market demand and by a desire to steal demand away from com
petitors.41 To the extent that nonprice investments are motivated by
consumer preferences embodied in the market demand function, such
investments are likely to be cost-justified, increase social welfare, and
be positively affected by market competition. To the extent that non
price competition is motivated by its ability to steal rather than stimu
late demand, such efforts are suspect from a welfare perspective.42
While nonprice investments yield positive benefits to consumers, non
price attributes may be supplied beyond the point where the marginal
cost of such services equals their marginal benefits. Put differently,
while consumers value nonprice amenities, they do not necessarily
value them at a level where they would be willing to pay the full cost
of the amenity if they had a choice.43 When this is so, the social cost of
providing the nonprice amenity will exceed the social benefits derived
from its provision. In these circumstances, restricting nonprice compe
tition increases total welfare.
This theoretical analysis comports with a substantial body of em
pirical evidence demonstrating a positive correlation between hospital
compep_tion and hospital expenses.44 In traditionally structured hospi-

nonprice competition such as advertising and quality of care has also intensified, as each
hospital desires to offer physicians and patients the latest medical technology and services in
an effort to present itself as a full service high quality institution. The hoped-for result of
these efforts, of course, is the attraction of quality physicians and more and better paying
inpatients." (citations to record omitted)), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
41. See Philip J. Held & Mark V. Pauly, Competition and Efficiency in the End Stage
Renal Disease Program, 2 J. HEALTH ECON. 95, 100-03 (1983) (modeling competition in
health care markets); Hammer, supra note 14, at 103-18 (same). The dynamics of hospital
nonprice rivalry in the Old Regime are structurally similar to the rivalry characteristic of the
price-regulated airline industry in the 1970s. See generally Lawrence J. White, Quality Com
petition and Regulation: Evidence from the Airline Industry, in REGULATING THE PRODUCT
(R.E. Caves & MJ. Roberts eds., 1975); Lawrence J. White, Quality Variation When Prices
Are Regulated, 3 BELL J. ECON. 425 (1972) (discussing rivalry in the price-regulated airline
industry).
42 See Hammer, supra note 23 ("Hospitals are concerned with the deteIDlinants of
hospital-specific demand. Quality investments stimulate hospital-specific demand both by
increasing market demand and, more importantly, by diverting demand from other hospitals.
The 'demand-stealing' effects provide incentives to supply quantities of the nonprice attrib
ute that may exceed the level justified by consumer preferences as reflected in the market
demand function."). One economist has gone so far as to model the demand-stealing aspect
of hospital nonprice competition as a prisoner's dilemma. See Joseph M. Jadlow, Hospital
Competition and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 25 RMSTA lNTRERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE
ECONOMICHE E COMERCIALI 360 (1978).
43. See Hammer, supra note 23.
See generally, e.g., MONICA NOETHER, COMPETITION AMONG HOSPITALS, (Staff
Report of the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission) (1987); Held & Pauly, su
pra note 41, at 95; Paul L. Joskow, The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Hospital
Bed Supply and the Reservation Quality of the Hospital, 11 BELL J. ECON. 421 (1980);
44.
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tal markets, higher levels of competition are associated with higher
medical costs. Conversely, economic concentration is associated with
correspondingly lower medical costs. This surprising phenomenon
presents a difficult dilemma for policymakers. Market power in the
hospital industry is likely to lead to both lower costs and, to the extent
that nonprice competition is associated with quality, lower quality of
care.45
The intramarket second-best tradeoffs in health care parallel the
discussion of negative price externalities. Given the multiple failures
in medical markets - imperfect information, moral hazard, agency
problems - competition may lead to a level of nonprice rivalry that
exceeds what is socially desirable, driving a wedge between the so
cially optimum equilibrium and the competitive equilibrium. In this
setting, one market failure (market power or cartelization) may coun
teract the effects of other market failures (imperfect information,
agency problems, and moral hazard). Consequently, it is at least plau
sible that mergers may lead to the provision of more efficient levels of
nonprice services and a more rational allocation of medical resources.
We can phrase this welfare analysis as a Kaldor-Hicks compensa
tion problem that illustrates the nature of the underlying tradeoff.46
Consumers benefit from nonprice competition. The reduction in non-

Monica Noether, Competition Among Hospitals, 7 J. HEALTII ECON. 259 (1988); James C.
Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost ofMedical Care, 1972 to 1982, 257 J.
AM. MED. Ass N 3241 (1987); James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, The Impact ofHospital
Market Structure on Patient Volume, Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care, 4 J.
HEALTII ECON. 333 (1985); George W. Wilson & Joseph M. Jadlow, Competition, Profit In·
centives, and Technical Efficiency in the Provision ofNuclear Medicine Services, 13 BELL J.
ECON. 472 (1982). For reviews of this literature, see Hammer, supra note 14, at 22-27;
Frederic J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate Antitrust Pol·
icy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 153-67 (1994); and Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita,
'

Hospital Market Structure, Hospital Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evi
dence Tell Us?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTII L. & POL'Y 117, 123-29 (1994).

45. See Hammer, supra note 23; Peter J. Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform: Arrow,
Coase and the Changing Structure of the Firm, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTII CARE
REFORM (Gregg Bloche ed., Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2000).
46. See Hammer, supra note 23 (discussing the welfare effects of hospital nonprice com
petition in terms of Kaldor-Hicks tradeoffs). For a discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks standard,
see J.R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105 (1940), and Nicolas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49
ECON. J. 549 (1939). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 239-40 (discussing the Kaldor
Hicks standard).
In this Article, I embrace forms of welfare analysis that go beyond simple Pareto
efficiency to engaging in Kaldor-Hicks type tradeoffs and assessments of individual utility
under various formulations of consumer surplus. These theories can be controversial, but
those controversies will not be explored here. For a general discussion of welfare and effi
ciency analysis, see C001ER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 49-51, and POSNER, supra note 7, at
12-17. For a discussion of the various approaches to consumer surplus, see infra notes 111·
120 and accompanying text. For a standard critique of Marshallian consumer surplus, see
PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 195-202 (enlarged ed.
1983).
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price competition resulting from merger or carte).ization decreases
consumer surplus. At the same time, nonprice competition is costly.
A reduction in the level of nonprice competition will lead to an in
crease in producer surplus (profits). If the increase in producer sur
plus more than offsets the decline in consumer surplus, then the reduc
tion in nonprice competition will yield a net increase in total welfare
under the Kaldor-Hicks standard. Thus, an antitrust regime that aims
at maximizing total welfare rather than competition or consumer sur
plus would allow such an exercise of market power.47

3.

R&D Joint Ventures, Advertising Restrictions,
and Other Examples

At first blush, intramarket second-best tradeoffs may seem foreign
to antitrust analysis. Untamed, second-best analysis certainly has
radical potential, and some may appropriately fear opening a Pan
dora's Box if the presence of such tradeoffs can be used to establish
antitrust defenses. In other respects, however, the underlying logic of
second-best theory and particular second-best problems are not
strangers to antitrust analysis,48 nor to other fields of law - such as in47. Again, the contrast with the consumer surplus standard is telling. If nonprice com
petition yields any benefit to consumers, then reducing nonprice competition will reduce
consumer surplus. A strict consumer surplus standard would forbid any second-best tradeoff
in this setting, regardless of the size of the corresponding increase in producer surplus or the
net effect on total welfare. There is the possibility that increases in producer surplus could
be shared with or "passed on" to consumers. In merger cases, a number of courts require
alleged productive efficiency benefits to be passed on in some form to consumers. See
Hammer, supra note 23 (discussing the passing-on requirement and citing cases). Similar
analysis would ask if any of the increase in producer surplus associated with reduced non
price competition would be shared with consumers. Price reductions would be one means.
Unfortunately, in markets where inefficient nonprice competition is caused by ineffective
price competition, price reductions are an unlikely mechanism to share welfare benefits. See
id.
48. In the past thirty years, the antitrust standards governing vertical restraints have
been completely re-written. The Court has gone from condemning vertical nonprice re
straints (i.e., exclusive territories, customer restrictions, and service requirements) as per se
illegal to embracing the efficiency-enhancing potential of these agreements under the rule of
reason. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (reversing the
per se rule condemning vertical nonprice restraints found in United States v. Arnold Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), in favor of rule-of-reason evaluation). This transformation re
sulted from the Court's acceptance of some basic economic theories illustrating the effi
ciency benefits of vertical restraints. The logic underlying this analysis bears a striking simi
larity to the logic underlying intramarket second-best tradeoffs. The goal of contemporary
antitrust law is the promotion of inter-brand competition. See Business Electronics v. Sharp
Electronics, Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) ("[I]nterbrand competition is the primary con
cern of the antitrust laws . . . ."). The Court is willing to accept restrictions on intra-brand
competition, i.e., competition between distributors selling the same brand such as Ford
automobiles, to the extent that such restrictions increase inter-brand competition, i.e., com
petition between distributors selling different product brands such as competition between
Ford and GM dealers.
The primary justification for vertical nonprice restraints is the prevention of free riding.
See Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 731 ("[M]anufacturers are often motivated by a legiti-

868

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:849

tellectual property - which openly accept tradeoffs between the so
cial costs of monopoly and the social benefits of innovation. It is easy
to think of numerous additional examples.
a. R&D Joint Ventures. Patents grant state-sanctioned monopolies
to inventors for a specified period of time on the theory that monop
oly profits are necessary to encourage innovation. The social costs as
sociated with restricting competition and limiting the dissemination of
technology are believed to be worth the social benefits of fostering
new innovation. This is a type of second-best tradeoff. Technology
presents both externalities and public goods problems. It is difficult
for the creator of new technology to privately appropriate all the so
cial benefits associated with its creation. Additionally, information is
a public good. Consumption by one person does not interfere with
consumption of that same information by another person. Social wel
fare is maximized, ex post, by disseminating information at the near
zero marginal cost of its production. In sanctioning patents and copy
rights, the legislature has consciously sacrificed the social value of
post-innovation competition for the objective of maximizing total wel
fare.
These concerns are not limited to the enforcement of intellectual
property rights. Antitrust law is frequently called upon to address
questions concerning technology. Not surprisingly, these cases can

mate desire to have dealers provide services, combined with the reality that price cutting is
frequently made possible by 'free riding' on the services provided by other dealers."); GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 ("Because of market imperfections such as the so-called 'free rider'
effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation,
despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services than
if none did."); see also Picker International, Inc. v. Leavitt, 865 F. Supp. 951, 968 (D. Mass.
1994) (upholding the reasonableness of vertical restrictions designed to prevent freeriding
on substantial R&D investments of a manufacturer of medical equipment).
Free riding is simply one variation of the externality story. A dealer of high-end audio
equipment invests substantial resources in providing an elaborate showroom and a trained
sales staff. These investments require the dealer to charge a higher price for his equipment
to recoup the expenses for nonprice service. The first dealer cannot internalize the benefits
of the nonprice investments if a second cost-cutting dealer is permitted to open a shop next
door and sell the identical equipment at a lower price because he does not offer the same
services. An exclusive territory - an agreement that might otherwise be condemned as a
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act - is permitted because it counteracts the
undesirable effects of free riding. The exclusive territory results in acknowledged anticom
petitive effects. By restricting intra-brand competition, the prices of the branded products
are higher than they otherwise would be. Indeed, the higher prices are the intended effect of
the restraint, because it permits the provision of services, promotion, and advertising that
would not otherwise be possible.
Vertical nonprice restraints are not the same as intramarket second-best tradeoffs. The
problem of incomplete contracts underlying vertical restraints is different than the classic
market failures subject to intramarket second-best tradeoffs (although many insights can be
gained by thinking of contracting failures as a type of market failure). This example reminds
us, however, that what we perceive to be foreign and what we perceive to be familiar de
pends often on framing, and that intramarket second-best tradeoffs can be framed in ways
that highlight similarities with established antitrust doctrines.
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raise second-best concerns, even if courts do not analyze the issues in
terms of second-best theory. Take the example of joint ventures for
research and development. Should antitrust courts permit a group of
horizontal competitors to form a joint venture aimed at pooling R&D
efforts and jointly marketing the resulting products?49 Multiple mar49. See generally Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Research Joint Ventures: An
Antitrust Analysis, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 315 (1986); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig,
Antitrustfor High-Technology Industries: Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers, 28
J.L. & ECON. 311 (1985).
There are surprisingly few published judicial opinions addressing cooperative R&D ini
tiatives. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has indicated that legitimate joint ventures
will be favorably treated under the rule of reason. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985) (suggesting that wholesale pur
chasing cooperatives are not the type of concerted activity likely to produce anticompetitive
effects); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (acknowledging the procom
petitive potential of joint ventures); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1979) (outlining the procompetitive benefits of BMI's blanket licensing prac
tices). For the most part, oversight of R&D ventures has been the domain of the enforce
ment agencies and addressed through various enforcement agency guidelines. See U.S.

Dep't ofJustice and U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors (Apr. 7, 2000); U.S. Dep't of Justice and U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing ofIntellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995); and U.S. Dep't ofJustice
Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 13,109.85
(Nov. 10, 1988) (Illustrative Case 6: Research and Development Joint Venture). Coopera
tive R&D initiatives are often examined through the business review process. See, e.g.,
American Heart Association Pharmaceutical Roundtable, 1998 DOJBRL LEXIS 7 (Mar. 20,
1998) (initiative sponsoring and funding basic biomedical research); Amoco, Arco, Exxon,
Mobile, Shel� Texaco, Texas A&M University, Initial Members of Cooperative, 1997
DOJBRL LEXIS 9 (Apr. 23, 1997) (cooperative project designed to perform exploration
and production research of a nature that is not attractive to individual firm research).
The handful of judicial opinions that have examined cooperative R&D efforts fail to
provide a systematic or comprehensive approach to the problem. The classic example of
collusive under-investment in R&D is the 1960s auto industry conspiracy to suppress re
search in pollution control devices. See Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109,
111-12 (1972) (outlining the elements of the antitrust conspiracy). Ironically, one of the al
leged justifications for the conspiracy was fear on the part of the individual auto companies
that they would be unable to recoup the cost of their investment in private pollution control
due to the externalities associated with environmental problems. See In re Multidistrict Ve
hicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 124 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Appellees urge that
this horizontal antitrust conspiracy was motivated . . • by appellant's conviction that antipol
lution devices are externalities, whose development would increase price without concomi
tant spur to consumer interest."). Other courts have expressed doubts as to whether alleged
collusive efforts of tobacco companies to suppress research and development or the mar
keting of new products would constitute an antitrust violation. See Steamfitters Local 420 v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 925 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is not clear whether even a con
certed decision among all of the businesses in an industry to keep one of their new products
from reaching consumers would be an antitrust violation."). Conflicting judicial statements
can also be found concerning the desirability of competition in the R&D arena. See, e.g.,
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 981-83 (D. Utah 1993) (noting the
range of legislative and policy arguments that might favor cooperative R&D initiatives);
Universal Analytics v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1170, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(expressing reluctance to treat certain R&D activities as predatory for antitrust purposes for
fear of chilling future innovation); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 55961 (D.D.C. 1987) (concluding that competition between the Regional Bell Operating Com
panies has improved research, development, innovation, and the introduction of new tech
nology); North Carolina v. Chas Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265, 284 n.28 (E.D.N.C. 1974)
(questioning the desirability of competition in terms of R&D in the pharmaceutical indus-
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ket failures are present. The public good aspects of information sug
gest that there is likely to be a suboptimal amount of industry R&D.
The public good characteristics also suggest that a direct government
subsidy may be a legitimate policy substitute for permitting increased
private cooperation. R&D also raises free rider problems. The re
search results may not be patentable, or may be only imperfectly pro
tected by patents and other intellectual property rights. No single firm
may want to invest substantial funds in R&D for fear that its competi
tors may simply copy the results and market a product at a lower
price, given that they did not have to absorb the initial R&D costs.
A joint venture is one means of internalizing some of the external
ities and could result in higher levels of R&D than would otherwise
exist. At the same time, these joint ventures can raise substantial anti
trust concerns. Even if we can be certain that there will be a higher
aggregate level of R&D because of the joint venture,50 the venture is
likely to produce market power in the newly created product market
that would not have existed under a regime of competitive R&D.
Competition, however, might lower the probability of any innovation
taking place at all, or might substantially delay the innovation.
Whether competition or cooperation will increase total welfare is of
ten a difficult question,51 but a question that may be better answered if

try). Similar issues have been raised by administrative bodies charged with assessing the
competitive effects of the conduct of various regulated entities. See, e.g., Money Stations v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 81 F3d 1128, 1134-36 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Board's de
termination under the Bank Holding Act that the consolidation of ATM networks would
produce public benefits in terms of expanded R&D efforts was not supported by substantial
evidence in the record); Ft. Pierce Utilities Authority v. United States, 606 F.2d 986, 990
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing early legislative exemption from regulatory antitrust scrutiny for
nuclear power plants as "research and development" facilities).
50. Cooperative R&D can raise anticompetitive risks. Under some circumstances, com
petition may generate stronger R&D incentives than will cooperation. There is also a risk of
collusive under-investment in R&D. See William F. Baxter, The Definition and Measure
ment of Market Power in Industries Characterized by Rapidly Developing and Changing
Technologies, 53 ANTITRUST LJ. 717, 720 (1984); Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 49, at
324. Additional anticompetitive risks of cooperative R&D are explored infra note 94 and

accompanying text.
51. The effect that cooperation and competition in R&D can have on total welfare has
been examined by economists. See, e.g., Barry Bozeman et al., An Economic Analysis of
R&D Joint Ventures, 7 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 263 (1986) (predicting that coop
eration will increase aggregate amounts of R&D in a model emphasizing the public good
nature of basic research); Alexis Jacquemin, Cooperative Agreements in R&D and European
Antitrust Policy, 32 EUR. ECON. REV. 551, 553-57 (1988) (examining the potential public
benefits and possible public costs of cooperative R&D initiatives); Michael L. Katz, An
Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 17 RAND J. ECON. 527, 536-38 (theo
retical assessment of the welfare effects of cooperative R&D); Takeo Nakao, Cost-Reducing
R&D in Oligopoly, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 131, 145-46 (1989) (highlighting the poten
tially ambiguous welfare effects of competitive and cooperative R&D efforts).
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the second-best dimensions underlying the problem are expressly ac
knowledged.52

b. Advertising Restrictions. Information market failures also raise
troubling questions for antitrust courts. Information in markets may
be imperfect because some characteristics of the product may be un
known to consumers, or can be acquired by consumers only after en
gaging in costly searches. It may be incomplete because purchasers
may not know all the price and quality attributes of competing prod
ucts. And information may be asymmetrically held because sellers
may have substantially better information than buyers. Information
problems can confront producers as well as consumers. Competitors
can respond to information problems in different ways. They can
share known information or they can cooperate in generating new in
formation. Competitors can engage in self-regulation to prevent
agency problems resulting from asymmetric information. Alterna
tively, competitors can attempt to control the type of advertising that
takes place in a world of imperfect information. Whether courts ex
pressly think of these issues in terms of second-best tradeoffs or not,
these cases are decided in the shadow of market failures and second
best concerns.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in California Dental Ass'n v.
F. T.C. is illustrative.53 At issue was a practice of the nonprofit Cali
fornia Dental Association restricting "price advertising, particularly
discounted fees, and advertising related to the quality of dental serv
ices."54 The Federal Trade Commission found the practice to be a per

52. How an affirmative defense for intramarket second-best tradeoffs would treat R&D
joint ventures is examined infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
53. California Dental Ass'n v. FfC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999). The articles relied upon by
the Court provide a good introduction to the problem of informational market failures, par
ticularly in markets for professional services. See id. at 1613-14 (discussing information
problems in the market for dental services and citing Jack L. Carr & Frank Mathewson, The
Economics of Law Firms: A Study of the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON.
307 (1990); George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Li
censing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979); 1 B.
FURROW, T. GREANEY, S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R. SCHWARZ, HEALTH LAW § 3-1, p. 86
(1995); and Robert G. Evans, Professionals and the Production Function: Can Competition
Policy Improve Efficiency in the Licensed Professions?, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND
REGULATION 225 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980)). For a discussion of the impact of imper
fect information on the functioning of competitive markets, see generally Alan Schwartz &
Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 641-51 (1979) (summarizing the results of eco
nomic models that examine the behavior of markets characterized by imperfect informa
tion); Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 686-88
(1985) (examining the effects of deceptive advertising on competitive equilibria); and Lillian
R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) ofthe Lanham Act: A
Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 18 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-13 (1992) (reviewing economic litera
ture on the competitive effects of advertising).
54. 119 S. Ct. at 1609.

872

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:849

se violation of antitrust law, and in the alternative to be an unreason
able restraint under a quick-look rule-of-reason analysis. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed on the basis of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis.
The Supreme Court reversed. Agreements, it said, are presumed to
be unlawful under the quick-look rule of reason if "an observer with
even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that
the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
consumers and markets. "55 This question, according to the Court,
must be answered in light of the "striking disparities between the in
formation available to the professional and the patient. "56
The Court proceeded to catalogue the informational failures
plaguing the market for dental services. Information in markets for
professional services is asymmetrically held - dentists are better in
formed than their patients. Moreover, it is difficult for patients to get
and verify information because of the search costs involved and the
experiential nature of some services. With experience goods such as
dental services, consumers are unable to assess the quality of the den
tist's skills until after they agree to and receive the service. Certain
dental services are also credence goods, meaning that even after re
ceiving the service, consumers may not be able to accurately assess the
quality of the dentist:

[T]he quality of professional services tends to resist either calibration or
monitoring by individual patients or clients, partly because of the spe
cialized knowledge required to evaluate services, and partly because of
the difficulty in determining whether, and the degree to which, an out
come is attributable to the quality of the service (like a poor job of tooth
filling) or to something else (like a very tough walnut).57
In the presence of multiple market failures, conduct that might
otherwise appear to be anticompetitive may in fact be welfare
enhancing. The California Dental Association argued that the adver
tising restrictions were procompetitive because they limited false and
misleading advertising, even if they also had the unintended effect of
limiting some truthful or desirable information as well. The Court
found the procompetitive potential of the restraint sufficiently plausi
ble to withstand quick-look rule-of-reason analysis and to require a
full-scale rule-of-reason examination:

Put another way, the CDA's rule appears to reflect the prediction that
any costs to competition associated with the elimination of across-the
board advertising will be outweighed by gains to consumer information
(and hence competition) created by discount advertising that is exact, ac
curate and more easily verifiable (at least by regulators). As a matter of

55. 119 s. a. at 1612.
56. 119 s. a. at 1613.
57. 119 s. a. at 1613-14.
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economics this may or may not be correct, but it is not implausible, and
neither a court nor the Commission may initially dismiss it as preemp
tively wrong.58
It remains an open question how best to evaluate the desirability of
these types of restrictions under the rule of reason.59

c. Other Illustrations. R&D joint ventures and restrictions on ad
vertising involve cases where antitrust courts and the enforcement
agencies are already struggling with market failures in the context of
rule-of-reason analysis. The following examples illustrate other areas
where intramarket second-best tradeoffs might be found. These ex
amples suggest more novel claims. Philip Areeda provides the hypo
thetical (a little dated in the age of cable TV and VCRs) of the major
television networks agreeing that each will set aside one hour an eve
ning for "quality" programming - cultural programming aimed at
audiences too small to be supported by commercial advertising.60
Could such a collusive restraint withstand antitrust scrutiny? The
agreement might be reasonable if it could be characterized as counter
acting market failures:

The economic argument would be that the television industry exhibits
this "market failure": given that government allo�tion limits the num
ber of channels and that each station or network seeks to maximize its
advertising revenues and therefore its audience for each broadcast hour,
cultural services that viewers and advertisers are ready to support are not
offered (unlike newspapers which can simultaneously provide culture
and comic strips). It would then be argued that the time set-aside for
quality corrects this market failure and thereby brings about a more
"competitive" result.61
This example arises in the context of a regulated industry. One
can imagine additional second-best concerns emerging in those sectors
of the economy that are currently being deregulated - telecommuni
cations, natural gas, and electricity. Relying upon competition in set
tings that retain quasi-public utility characteristics may engender
forms of cooperation that facially appear to be anticompetitive, but
which may have underlying efficiency justifications.
Other areas of second-best tradeoffs may involve the relationship
between market structure and the appropriate tort liability standard,62

58. 119 S. Ct. at 1615.
59. How an affirmative defense for intramarket second-best tradeoffs would treat adver
tising restrictions is examined infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
60. See PHILIP E. AREEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
GENERAL ISSUES 7-8 (Federal Judicial Ctr., Educ. and Training Series, 1981).
61. Id. at8.
62. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, Product Liability, Consumer Mis
perceptions, and Market Power, 14 BELL J. ECON. 581 {1983) (exploring the relationship be
tween market structure and the appropriate standard of tort liability).
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or the relationship between the number of competitors and price in
markets where search costs and reputation play a significant role,63 or
the entry into a monopoly market by a higher cost producer.64 Finally,
one can imagine numerous types of rent-dissipating behavior that
could justify second-best analysis. Industries may engage in advertis
ing which is excessive by the total welfare criterion because it is per
suasive without being informative. Pharmaceutical companies, for ex
ample, may devote too much money to influence the prescription
practices of physicians, or markets may exhibit too much product dif
ferentiation.65

63. See Mark V. Pauly & Mark A. Satterwaite, The Pricing ofPrimary Care Physicians'
Services: A Test ofthe Role of Consumer Information, 12 BELL J. ECON. 488, 489 {"First, if
the number of physicians within a community increases, then consumer information about
each physician decreases; thus, consumers have a more difficult time in the search for new
physicians. Second, if this search becomes more difficult, then consumers become Jess price
sensitive, i.e., each physician's demand curve becomes Jess elastic. Consequently, an in
creased supply of physicians, or an increase in any other factor that makes consumers' search
more difficult, may cause physician equilibrium fees to rise.").
64. Richard Schmalensee has written about this possibility. See Richard Schmalensee, Is
More Competition Necessarily Good?, 4 INDUS. ORG. REV. 120 {1976). Where the phe
nomenon Schmalensee identifies exists, entry into a monopoly market by a higher-cost com
petitor may actually reduce total welfare. Two considerations are at play. So Jong as the
producers act independently, entry will result in an increase in output and a decrease in
price, which will unambiguously increase consumer surplus. The higher-cost producer, how
ever, is Jess efficient. At some point, depending upon how much higher the entrant's costs
are and the amount of output being produced by the higher-cost firm, the social Joss associ
ated with the higher costs and the reduction in producer surplus can outweigh the increase in
consumer surplus, leading to a reduction in total welfare. If this is the case, then entry may
not be desirable, and government restrictions on entry, or the sanctioning of conduct that
may otherwise be predatory or exclusionary may be justified. See id. at 120 {"The apparent
policy implication of this result is disturbing: privately profitable entry may not be socially
desirable if the entrant's costs exceed those of existing firms. Society as a whole would be
better off if existing firms would be allowed to bribe potential entrants not to enter, or if en
try was restricted by government regulation of some sort."). This example again illustrates
the difference between a total welfare and a consumer surplus standard. Under a total wel
fare standard, entry would be prohibited if the Joss in producer surplus exceeded the gain in
consumer surplus. Under a consumer surplus standard, entry would be permitted if there
would be any increase in consumer surplus.
65. It is appropriate to end this list of examples with one that sounds a cautionary note.
Second-best analysis invites the pursuit of interesting theoretical puzzles. It is one thing to
present a plausible second-best story; it is quite another to substantiate the theory and to
present evidence of a real increase in social welfare. Insurance markets, for example, are
associated with problems of moral hazard. Moral hazard is typically associated with higher
than optimal rates of consumption. It is plausible that market power {by increasing price
and decreasing consumption) may counteract this tendency and lead to a net increase in to
tal welfare. Hence, if second-best analysis had a place at the antitrust table, merging provid
ers in such industries might have a defense to charges of monopolizing the market.
Yet, in health care markets where this theory has been examined, it appears that this in
tuition is incorrect. Martin Gaynor, Deborah Haas-Wilson, and William Vogt demonstrate
that increasing the price of medical services through increased provider market power does
not necessarily increase total welfare (counteract the effects of moral hazard) in the face of a
competitive insurance market. See Martin Gaynor et al., Are Invisible Hands Good Hands?
Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second Best in Health Care Markets, at 3 {NBER
Working Paper No. W6865, Dec. 1998) (on file with author). The intuition behind this
analysis is relatively straightforward. Insurance companies are already acting to establish
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How should courts respond to these claims that market power may
be desirable? At this juncture, it is useful to distinguish two distinct
claims advanced in this Article. My primary claim is that the antitrust
framework should be broadened to consider these types of intramar
ket second-best tradeoffs. Private conduct that ordinarily would be
condemned as a restraint of trade, either as single-firm behavior or as
collaborative behavior, may in fact be desirable. What makes the
prima facie bad behavior good is that it occurs in a market that is im
perfect, that in one or more ways has "failed" and is not likely to cor
rect its failures on its own. Despite the seeming paradox, the undesir
able consequences of market failure may be ameliorated by private
behavior that in other circumstances would itself be a market failure.
My second claim is that courts should assess the desirability of such
tradeoffs in reference to the effect of the restraint on total welfare.
This requires examining the well-being of producers along with the
well-being of consumers. While I believe the claims are complemen
tary, it is possible to acknowledge the relevance of intramarket
second-best concerns and assess such tradeoffs in light of their effect
.on consumer surplus.
The argument that under certain circumstances market power may
produce beneficial results, and that antitrust law should be flexible
enough to accommodate such possibilities is not entirely new. The
next Section examines how intramarket second-best concerns compare
with the productive efficiency defense advocated by Oliver
Williamson, and explores the similarities between second-best trade
offs and market failure defenses that have been proposed by various
antitrust scholars.

optimum rates of co-insurance and consumer cost-sharing in light of the prevailing moral
hazard concerns. See id. at 3. Optimally set co-insurance rates will not necessarily yield any
thing close to the first-best outcome, but they do imply that further welfare gams cannot be
attained along this dimension by further raising prices through increased provider market
power.
It is significant that Gaynor, Haas-Wilson, and Vogt examined the market failure of
moral hazard in isolation. As the discussion of hospital non-price competition in Section
I.B.2 suggests, increased provider market power may result in welfare gains unrelated to the
problem of moral hazard. Moreover, different market failures, such as those involving non
price competition, or different combinations of market failures may well produce welfare
effects different from the ones identified by these authors. See id. at 20 ("We must apply
some caveats to these conclusions, however. In this paper, we have analyzed one of the dis
tortions in medical markets: moral hazard. We have not considered other factors that are
commonly cited in rendering competition in medical markets different risk selection in in
surance markets, agency problems in medical markets (i.e., induced demand), and the pres
ence of non-profit firms. It remains for future research to consider the constellation of these
imperfections in concert.").
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Antitrust Law and Second-Best Concerns: From Productive
Efficiency to Market Failure
1.

Williamson's Productive Efficiency Defense

Analytically, the issues raised by intramarket second-best tradeoffs
are similar to those raised by the efficiency defense long advocated by
Oliver Williamson.66 Williamson recognized that certain forms of pro
ductive efficiency can be achieved only at the price of sacrificing allo
cative efficiency.67 Figure 3 reproduces the partial equilibrium frame
work Williamson developed to assess these tradeoffs.68

66. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 18 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrnst Defense]; Williamson, supra note 2, at 105; Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrnst Defense: Correction and Reply, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1372 (1968); Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Reply, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 954 (1969);
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699,
699 (1977) [hereinafter Williamson, Economies Revisited].
67. "A production process is said to be productively efficient if it yields a given level of
output with the least cost combination of inputs." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 17.
"A particular distribution of goods among consumers is said to be allocatively efficient if it is
not possible to redistribute the goods so as to make at least one consumer better off (in his
own estimation) without making another consumer worse off (again, in his own estima
tion)." Id. at 18.
68. For Williamson's exposition of the model and the efficiency tradeoffs, see
Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra note 66, at 706-09, and Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrnst Defense, supra note 66, at 21-23. For summaries or discussions of Williamson's
model, see BORK, supra note 12, at 107-10; Jerome Ellig, Computer Reservation Systems,
Creative Destruction, and Consumer Welfare: Some Unsettled Issues, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 287,
295-96 (1991); Fisher & Lande, supra note 23, at 1626-30; and David Millon, The Sherman
Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1229-30 n.43 (1988). Williamson's
views have evolved since the 1960s to stress the importance of institutional economics and
transaction costs. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). Still, Williamson's partial equilibrium
framework provides an appropriate means of examining the static efficiency of mergers.
Comparative institutional analysis can be folded into the dynamic efficiency considerations
outlined in the affirmative defense discussed infra Section l.D.
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FIGURE THREE: WJLLIAMSON'S EFFICIENCY TRADEOFFS
p
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Assuming that the increase in productive efficiency could be ob
tained only by a substantial increase in economic concentration (a
merger to monopoly in the extreme case), the cost savings association
with increased productive efficiency (represented graphically by a
downward shift in the producer's cost function - "Area 2 Cost Sav
ings" in figure 3) is balanced against the loss in allocative efficiency
represented by the deadweight loss triangle traditionally associated
with monopolies ("Area 1" in figure 3). If the gains in productive effi
ciency exceed the losses from decreased allocative efficiency, then,
Williamson argued, antitrust law should permit the increase in market
power.69

69. Williamson combined this framework for analyzing efficiency tradeoffs with the
predictive insight that relatively small cost reductions would outweigh losses in allocative
efficiency. See Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra note 66, at 699, 709; Williamson,
Economies as an Antitmst Defense, supra note 66, at 22-23. Productive efficiency gains occur
with every product produced while the loss of allocative efficiency is limited to marginal con
sumers. This same logic underlies the assertion that the "wealth transfer'' effects of market
power (the transformation of consumer surplus into producer surplus) will also normally
outweigh the deadweight loss. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 23, at 1644-46; Harris &
Jorde, supra note 13, at 11-12.
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The form of Williamson's argument is similar to the form of the
argument in favor of intramarket second-best tradeoffs. Conduct that
would otherwise be viewed as anticompetitive and therefore prohib
ited by the antitrust laws (the accumulation of market power) should
be permitted because the conduct produces an increase in total wel
fare. In addition, both the analysis of productive efficiency claims and
intramarket second-best tradeoffs adopt a partial equilibrium frame
work and employ a total welfare standard to guide antitrust decision
making. This last point deserves emphasis. Commentators often
overlook the fact that Williamson's graphic illustration of the tradeoff
between allocative and productive efficiency is simply a means of as
certaining the effect of merger on total welfare. In his 1969 and 1977
treatments of efficiency tradeoffs, Williamson introduced a basic wel
fare function to complement the graphic analysis:

The partial equilibrium apparatus that I would propose for purposes of
examining the trade-off question is one in which the welfare function is
expressed as W (TR + S) - (TC - R), where TR refers to total revenue,
S to consumer surplus, TC to total cost, and R to intramarginal rents.
The terms in the first set of parentheses reflect the social benefits associ
ated with the activity in question, while the terms in the second (under
appropriate restrictions) reflect social costs. The allocative efficiency
consequences of any merger that increases both efficiency and market
power can be evaluated only by estimating net effects.70
=

The implications of the alleged restraint on allocative and productive
efficiencies are simply subcomponents in a broader welfare analysis.
The ultimate focus is the impact of a proposed merger or other re
straint of trade on total welfare.71
Williamson's analysis, however, presents less difficult doctrinal is
sues for antitrust scholars than do intramarket second-best tradeoffs.
While Williamson's total welfare orientation is broad enough to en
compass a range of other allocative efficiency concerns, he focuses on
the effects of market power on productive efficiency. This focus has
its antecedents in concerns over economies of scale, natural monopo
lies, and the problems presented by the potentially efficient monopo
list. The proposition that antitrust law should not be interpreted in a

70. Williamson, supra note 2, at 107; see also Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra
note 66, at 708 n.27.
71. Williamson's framework is also useful because the arguments that have been levied
for and against his efficiency tradeoffs parallel many of the arguments that can be made for
and against permitting intramarket second-best tradeoff, or total welfare analysis more gen
erally. See, e.g., Fisher & Lande, supra note 23, at 1624-51 (rejecting Williamson's proposed
tradeoff analysis and its underlying total welfare standard because of the assorted difficulties
associated with litigating the defense).
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manner that needlessly sacrifices productive efficiency has a histori
cally respectable pedigree.72
Intramarket second-best analysis, however, is concerned not with
the implications of market power for productive efficiency, but with
the effects of market structure on allocative efficiency. Analytically,
second-best concerns are the flip side of the same coin as Williamson's
productive efficiency defense, and both fit comfortably within a total
welfare orientation. Pragmatically, however, a market failure defense
is more controversial. Intramarket second-best tradeoffs more pro
foundly question the assumption that "competition" is either workable
or desirable.
Hence, the argument that intramarket second-best
tradeoffs can justify restraints of trade has substantially less support in
the history and tradition of antitrust enforcement than do productive
efficiency claims.

2.

Market Failure Defenses

The possibility of a market failure defense has been waiting in the
wings of antitrust law for many years. Phillip Areeda posed the ques
tion: "[C]an some general welfare claims be expressed as improve
ments in competition?"73 Areeda thought they could be, if they cor
rected market failures and were associated with an increase in total
welfare, such as an expansion of output.74 "We might even believe
that the apparent restraint actually moves market performance closer
to the competitive result. Rather than suppressing competition, offset
ting a 'market failure' promotes competitive results."75 Doctrinally,
Areeda recasts remedying market failures and increasing total welfare
in the rhetoric of "promoting competition."76
72. A number of these issues were recognized and debated during the passage of the
Sherman Act, and these same issues have occupied American economists since the 1880s.
See generally F.M. Scherer, Efficiency, Fairness and the Early Contribution of Economists to
the Antitrust Debate, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 243 (1990). To be sure, at the time of Williamson's
writings, many of these lessons had been lost on a Court that seemed to treat certain produc
tive efficiencies as a reason for opposing mergers. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.");
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("Congress appreciated that oc
casional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries
and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of deconcentration."). In
this respect, Williamson's work was an important wake-up call. Today, most contemporary
approaches to antitrust law would acknowledge a need to accommodate productive effi
ciency in some fashion, even if they disagree over the specific form of the accommodation.
73. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1504, at 382 (1978); see also AREEDA, su
pra note 60, at 7-8 (exploring the possibility of justifying restraints of trade that are targeted
at correcting market failures as being procompetitive).
74.

See AREEDA, supra note 73, § 1504, at 383.

75.

Id.

76. Id. ("This is not the place to work out the soundness of that argument. It is enough
to see that many claims of redeeming virtue expressed by laymen in 'public interest' terms
can be reformulated in terms of promoting competition."); see also id. § 1511, at 434-36 (ex-
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Thomas Greaney has built on Areeda's insight to advocate a mar
ket failure defense in health care.77 Greaney focuses on the "procom
petitive" objective of overcoming the market failures plaguing the
health care industry. He contends that "the defense could signify
nothing more than an application of ancillary restraints principles."78
Recognizing that defendants could manipulate a market failure de
fense, he proposes a number of limiting principles. First, his defense
would be narrowly construed if the underlying conduct constituted a
"naked restraint."79 Second, "courts should require proof that re
moval of the market imperfections would actually improve competi
tive outcomes."80 Finally, courts must "assess the risk that self
regulatory power might be abused or would contribute to anticompeti
tive conditions."81 Into this last principle Greaney reads a requirement
that the restraint be necessary to the procompetitive objective and be
no broader in scope than required to achieve the objective.82
Joseph Brodley similarly advocates allowing a defense for "pro
ductive" and "innovative" efficiencies, but defines these efficiencies in
terms of overcoming competitive market failures.83 "[I]n cases of
competitive market failure, antitrust should recognize a limited effi
ciencies justification for transactions that temporarily restrict competi
tion in order to correct market failure and thereby advance production
and innovation efficiency."84 Brodley would impose three conditions
on such a defense:

amining the increasing range of factors considered by the Court to constitute "procompeti
tive" justifications under the rule of reason); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 1504, at 397-402 (Supp. 1998) (exploring the growing
range of "legitimate objectives" recognized by lower courts engaging in rule·of-reason
analysis).

77. See Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust
Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 627-49 (1989). Market failures in health care
include informational problems, externalities, the presence of public goods, and the effects
of insurance. See id. at 632-40. Other scholars have acknowledged the possibility of a mar
ket failure defense to justify forms of professional self-regulation, but have cautioned against
too readily recognizing such a defense in health care markets. See Qark C. Havighurst,
Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE
LJ. 1071, 1095-96; Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1117, 1143-44 (1986); Qark C. Havighurst & Nancy M.P. King, Pri

vate Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective, 9 AM. J.L. & MED.

263, 297-98 (1983).
78.

Greaney, supra note 77, at 629.

79. See id. at 647.
80. Id.
81. Id.

at 648.

82 See id.
83. See Brodley, supra note 21, at 1020-21.
84. Id.

at 1042. "The necessary precondition for an efficiencies defense is competitive
market failure - a condition in which interfirm rivahy does not enhance social wealth and
advance the long-run interest of consumers." Id. at 1046. "A competitive market failure
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First, the projected activity must increase total social welfare by realizing
significant production or innovation efficiencies. Second, the activity
must be necessary to achieve such efficiencies and, among reasonably
available alternatives, be least harmful in its effect on consumers. Third,
the activity must not permanently suppress interfirm rivalry, but must
allow for the eventual reestablishment of competition.85
Bradley finds a doctrinal home that is similar to the "procompeti
tive" rationalizations of Areeda and Greaney and notes that in recent
years, the Court "has been more willing to uphold private action in
volving the creation or exercise of market power as an appropriate re
sponse to market failure. "86 "In the presence of either type of market
failure the recognition of an efficiencies defense creates no tension be
tween promoting socially desirable competition and achieving effi
ciency because, in the absence of the ·efficiency-justified restraint,
there would be less competition still."87 Remedying market failures,
increasing efficiency, and improving social welfare are all, in Bradley's
view, "procompetitive."
A final advocate of a market failure defense is Christopher
Leslie.88 Leslie proposes a market failure defense to horizontal price
fixing claims where the commodity at issue is associated with substan
tial negative externalities. "To warrant a successful market failure de
fense, a product must possess four characteristics: (1) it must have
negative externalities, (2) it must be undertaxed, (3) it must have elas
tic demand, and (4) it must have feasible alternatives."89 This ap
proach focuses on the particular economic characteristics of the prod
uct, rather than on the welfare effects of the restraints, although the
factors identified by Leslie would each be relevant in assessing the
magnitude of the pre-restraint loss in allocative efficiency and the
post-restraint increase (if any) in total welfare. Leslie's primary con
tribution, however, is to recognize the serious doctrinal challenges that
face any effort to establish a market failure defense and to appreciate

requires a breakdown in one or more of the basic conditions for a competitive market . . . ."
Id. Brodley gives examples of externalities, see id. at
and of the "inability of an in
ventor to capture economic reward in the absence of a monopoly patent right," id. at

1046-47,

85.

Id. at 1037-38.

1047.

Procedurally, Brodley's defense would entail a two-stage administra
tive process - a threshold or ex ante stage followed by an ex post review. See id. at
At the ex ante stage, the defendants must show that the alleged efficiencies are plausible,
that the conduct represents the least restrictive means of addressing the market failure, and
that the court could prospectively impose an effective remedy if the conduct failed to
achieve the projected efficiencies. See id. At the ex post stage, the court would assess
whether the efficiencies had in fact been obtained. See id. at

1048.

1048-49.

86. Id. at 1047 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979)).
87. Id.
88. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 243.
89. Id. at 275.
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the fact that there may be a substantial difference between conduct
that is "efficient" in the sense of being welfare-enhancing and conduct
that is "competitive" or "procompetitive."90
D.

The Anatomy ofan Affirmative Defense for Intramarket
Second-Best Tradeoffs

My case for intramarket second-best claims follows in the tradition
of these writers. I believe that claims for second-best tradeoffs should
be treated as an affirmative defense capable of rebutting the legal pre
sumption that conduct is anticompetitive. One setting where such a
defense might matter is where a merger between firms produces post
merger concentration ratios that exceed enforcement agency and
court-established thresholds, but where such market power may actu
ally be welfare-enhancing. Another setting is where conduct tradi
tionally considered to be per se illegal - price fixing and horizontal
territorial divisions - and therefore presumed to be anticompetitive,
may in fact have beneficial consequences.
On the theory that the core concern of the antitrust laws is overall
market efficiency, this antitrust defense focuses more on total welfare
than competition. To make out a successful intramarket second-best
defense, defendants in my view would have to establish the following:
first, that the alleged anticompetitive conduct remedies an identifiable
market failure or market failures; second, that the conduct will result
in a net increase in total welfare (static efficiency);91 third, that the
conduct will not substantially impair the ability of public or private ac
tors subsequently to ameliorate the effects of the market failure (dy
namic efficiency); and finally, that there is not a less restrictive alterna
tive consistent with the antitrust laws that the parties could undertake
to achieve similar welfare gains.92 In the initial stages and until further

90. See id. at 255-67 (examining the Supreme Court's treatment of efficiency and com
petition). In addition, Leslie provides a well-developed discussion of the justifications for a
market failure defense within the context of the second-best theory. See id. at 267-72.
Leslie's characterization of the conflict between competition and efficiency differs substan
tially from the harmonious views of Areeda, Greaney, and Brodley. In important respects,
however, both views are correct. Recognizing a market failure defense is at the same time a
natural evolution of some approaches to antitrust law and a radical substitution of economic
efficiency in place of competition for other schools of antitrust thought. This underscores
the doctrinally provocative side of intramarket second-best concerns and anticipates the dis
cussion of antitrust scholarship and methodology that is examined infra Part III.

91. If one wanted to address intramarket second-best concerns but retain an antitrust
focus on consumer surplus, this factor could be redefined in terms of proving an increase in
consumer surplus.
92. There are important similarities and differences between the defense I propose and
the market failure defenses examined in the previous Section. Each defense is rooted in the
existence of economic market failures and private efforts that arguably overcome those fail
ures. No level of altruism, however, should be attributed to the private actors. Private par
ties act to maximize profits. Intramarket second-best tradeoffs and other market failure de-
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evidence exists as to the ability to litigate and manage intramarket
second-best claims, defendants should be required to demonstrate the
four elements with clear and convincing evidence. These rigorous
standards recognize that allowing the sort of second-best defense that
I advocate liberalizes the status quo and cautions that until the merits
of the defense are demonstrated in actual cases, errors should be those
that disproportionately stem from doing what we do now.
Some might argue that the test is too rigorous and that the defense
will forever remain hypothetical, as no merger or restraint of trade will
be able to meet my proposed standards. This is not true. The cases
with second-best overtones, such as R&D joint ventures, that cur
rently pass antitrust muster under the rule of reason illustrate that
strong second-best claims are not merely hypothetical. The public
good and positive externalities characteristics of R&D joint ventures
are plain. It should be relatively easy in appropriate cases to demon
strate an increase in total welfare (static efficiency) by documenting
increased levels of research expenditures, increased probabilities of
successful innovation, and the likelihood that new products will be

fenses seek to exploit the potential coincidence of actions that increase both producer and
total welfare, while still enforcing antitrust prohibitions in those cases where private actions
decrease total welfare.
Although each defense seeks to identify private conduct that is efficiency-enhancing, the
intramarket second-best defense, unlike those of Areeda and Greaney, accomplishes this by
requiring parties to prove a net increase in total welfare, rather than showing that the con
duct "promotes competitive results," AREEDA, supra note 73, § 1504, at 383, or "improve[s]
competitive outcomes," Greaney, supra note 77, at 647.
Further, the intramarket second-best defense emphasizes dynamic efficiency concerns.
Unlike Brodley, who would bifurcate the procedure into an ex ante and an ex post review,
see Brodley, supra note 21, at 1048-49, my proposal would make all assessments at the initial
proceeding. Also unlike Brodley, my concern is not in ensuring the eventual reemergence of
market competition. See id. at 1037-38. Rather, my defense merely leaves the door open for
subsequent public or private efforts to provide more effective remedies to the underlying
market failure. Brodley's requirement of the reemergence of competition seems oddly mis
directed when the underlying problem is one of market failure. Brodley's requirement stems
from his view that antitrust law must safeguard individual consumer surplus and his belief
that "competition" is the best method to ensure that consumers receive their fair share of
the economic pie. See id. at 1038-39 ("This condition attempts to assure that consumers will
eventually receive an appropriate share of the increased social wealth created by the subor
dination of their immediate interest. An appropriate share for consumers is simply the share
of economic surplus that a competitive market would provide."). Many market failures are
chronic rather than transitory. If a noncompetitive solution is both welfare-enhancing and
stable over time, it should not be condemned merely because of its longevity. The policy
objective should be to encourage the emergence of the private or public response that is
most capable of improving social welfare, not the imposition of "competition" in settings
where competition is unworkable or undesirable. This difference in market failure defenses
once again illustrates how total welfare and consumer surplus orientations can lead to very
different doctrinal standards.
Finally, the intramarket second-best defense advocated here differs from Leslie's de
fense in that it is framed in terms of a standard that can be used to assess private responses
to market failures, rather than a set of economic characteristics that are likely to be present
if such a standard is to be satisfied.
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marketed that othenvise might not be produced.93 Establishing the
dynamic efficiency of such ventures would entail proving many of the
same things that must be proven to show that the restraints are rea
sonably necessary to the venture and appropriately narrow in scope
under the traditional ancillary restraints test: that the venture parties
consist of a reasonably small percentage of all market actors, that the
venture will cross-license new technology, that the venture is designed
to ensure reasonable amounts of competition in the new product mar
ket, and that there are appropriate internal restrictions to prevent
forms of spillover collusion.94 Similar considerations would be rele93. I do not want to trivialize the issues involved in assessing the welfare effects of co
operative R&D. R&D joint ventures can raise difficult and complicated questions. Some of
the theoretical difficulties were suggested earlier. See supra note 51 (examining welfare ef·
fects of cooperative R&D). Patents and intellectual property rights have also been the sub
ject of extensive investigations, yielding conflicting results on questions such as what is the
optimum length of time for patent protection, see generally W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION,
GROWTH AND WELFARE 70-90 {1969); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 442 {2d ed. 1980); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Opti·
mum Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 {1990); Edwin Mansfield, Patents
and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 175 {1986), and what are
the most likely sources of invention in the economy, see Gil.BERT KlvENSON, nm ART AND
SCIENCE OF INvENTING 2 {2d ed. 1982); TREVOR I. WILLIAMS, A SHORT HISTORY OF
TWENTIETH CENTURY TECHNOLOGY 13 {1982). While these issues are difficult to answer
in the abstract, they may be substantially easier to answer on a case-by-case basis, especially
in light of the self-selection process involved in privately choosing research projects and ini
tiating cooperative ventures. For further discussion of these issues, see generally Louis
Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 {1984),
and Robert P. Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839 {1990).
The social value of the cooperative R&D will vary significantly depending upon the type
of research at issue. Basic research usually presents stronger public good justifications than
research targeted at marginal advances in existing products, such as in-the-front-door ice
water for the family refrigerator. The total welfare standard should be flexible enough to
accommodate such differences.
94. R&D joint ventures are evaluated under the rule of reason. See National Coopera·
tive Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05
{1988)). The Act mandates rule-of-reason analysis and de-trebles damages for those ven·
tures that comply with its registration provisions. The rule of reason as applied to R&D
joint ventures invokes an abstract balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects. This bal
ancing often lacks specific analytic content. "The Department of Justice will not challenge a
true joint research and development venture on antitrust grounds, unless the Department
determines that the venture will have anticompetitive effects in a properly defined market
that outweigh the venture's procompetitive benefits." American Heart Association Pharma·
ceutical Roundtable, 1998 DOJBRL LEXIS 7, *7-*8 {Mar. 20, 1998); see also U.S. Dep't of
Justice Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 49, at 20,627 ("[T]he
possibility of anticompetitive effects would not lead the Department automatically to con·
demn the joint venture. The Department would consider whether the threat of anticompeti·
tive effects would be outweighed by procompetitive efficiencies that the parties claimed
would result from the joint venture.").
Greater insight can be gained by looking at the factors the Department of Justice deems
relevant to its analysis. Although technically superseded by the 1945 Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing ofIntellectual Property, supra note 50, Case 6 of the earlier Antitrust Guide·
lines for International Operations still provides a useful illustration. No anticompetitive ef·
fects are thought to be likely if there are at least four other comparable R&D efforts under
way in the same R&D market. See id. at 20,625. Importantly, the DOJ recognizes that co·
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vant in establishing that the venture is the least restrictive means of
obtaining the alleged benefits.
While the facts of California Dental are somewhat problematic,
one can conceive of private restraints designed to counteract informa
tional market failures that could withstand scrutiny under the test.
The advertising restriction in California Dental is troublesome because
closer examination may well demonstrate that the restraint is anti
competitive and will decrease total welfare. A more defensible exam
ple would be a private agreement by producers to standardize the re
porting format of information for consumers.
These types of
agreements can facilitate consumer price comparisons and reduce con
sumer search costs.95 Standardization agreements can also pose com
petitive risks. Standardized agreements can make it easier for com-

ordination in the market for, the new technology may be essential to provide the necessary
incentives to undertake the research in the first place. See id. at 20,626 ("Without such joint
coordination, the value of the parties' R&D might be dissipated through competition in the
product market As a result, firms might avoid efficient joint R&D altogether, which might
result in the costly duplication of R&D efforts. Coordination in markets using the technol
ogy output of the joint venture is therefore often essential to beneficial R&D."). Many pro
competitive benefits can flow from cooperative R&D: the creation of new technologies,
products, and processes that might not otherwise exist; the sharing of economic risk; pooling
of complementary information, technology, and skills; low-cost transfer of information be
tween participants; and the prevention of free-riding. See id. at 20,627. Anticompetitive
threats are also real. The DOJ is concerned that venture restrictions may be a sham to coor
dinate collusion in existing product markets, or that the sharing of information about the
joint venture can facilitate cooperation outside the venture - forms of spillover collusion.
See id. at 20,626. The DOJ will review potentially anticompetitive aspects of the venture
under the traditional test for ancillary restraints, examining whether they are "reasonably
necessary to the successful operation of the venture." Id. at 20,627. R&D joint ventures
raise difficult questions about membership. Overinclusive membership can undermine in
centives to innovate. Underinclusive membership can potentially deny non-members tech
nology that may become essential to remain competitive.
There is nothing in this analysis that necessarily conflicts with the affirmative defense
proposed in this Article. Indeed, the framework outlined for evaluating intramarket second
best tradeoffs may add rigor and clarity to the evaluation of R&D joint ventures. The focus
on market failures ensures that cooperative efforts are grounded in economic settings where
cooperation is most likely to be necessary and desirable. Assessing the impact of the venture
on total welfare provides a clearer metric for analysis than does the abstract balancing of
pro- and anticompetitive effects, even if a number of the analytical factors are the same.
Finally, the focus on dynamic efficiency makes explicit a set of competitive concerns that are
implicit in the present analysis, but not systematically developed. Not surprisingly, defen
dants would most likely favor existing rule-of-reason evaluation. Clarity of analysis may or
may not be a strategic virtue for litigants. More importantly, defendants would resist the
heightened evidentiary burdens imposed by the rule advocated in this Article.
95. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 53, at 672-73 ("[T]he government should consider
relaxing the antitrust laws to permit more voluntary standardization of the format in which
contract prices and terms are quoted. . . . This is not to say that the government should be
nignly view agreements by firms to fix uniformly the substantive aspects of their transac
tions, but only to suggest the social desirability of agreements to use a common format to set
out in a standard fashion the terms and prices each firm individually chooses to offer."); see
also Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protec
tion Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661, 691 {1982) {discussing the benefits of standardized disclo
sure requirements to facilitate consumer price comparisons).
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petitors to enter into collusive agreements, or may make the detection
of cheating on cartel agreements easier to identify and privately en
force. Moreover, the agreement to a standardized format may spill
over into agreements on substantive aspects of the terms or conditions
of sale.96
In terms of the intramarket second-best defense, proponents of a
private standardization agreement would first have to document the
various market failures being addressed. Here, the focus would not
simply be on asserting the existence of informational market failures,
but on a detailed description of the nature of the goods in question,
consumer search costs, and the buying practices of different purchas
ing groups.97 Second, proponents would have to demonstrate a likely

96. Some of these concerns can be illustrated by the agreement in Catalino, Inc. v. Tar
get Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 643 (1980). The Ninth Circuit
held that a horizontal agreement among beer wholesalers to eliminate short-term credit
terms was not per se illegal, but would be evaluated under the rule of reason. The court rea
soned that agreement might actually enhance competition. "[C]ompetition could be fos
tered by the increased visibility of price made possible by the agreement to eliminate credit.
For example, an agreement to eliminate credit might foster competition by increasing the
visibility of the price term, and hence, promote open price competition in an industry in
which imperfect information shielded various sellers from vigorous competition." 605 F.2d
at 1099. The court favorably cited the work of Lawrence Sullivan discussing the potential
benefits of standardization. See 605 F.2d at 1099 n.5 (citing L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 99, at 277 (1977)). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a
horizontal agreement not to compete on credit terms was a per se illegal price fixing agree
ment See 446 U.S. at 647. Significantly, the agreement in Catalino goes far beyond the
types of format standardization advocated by Shwartz & Wilde, supra note 53. The beer
wholesalers agreed to fix a substantive term of the agreement, presenting a clear competitive
threat without any sufficiently persuasive offsetting welfare gain.
97. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's tying cases create confusion as to when in
formational "market imperfections" can or should be recognized for antitrust purposes. In
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Court reasoned that while market im
perfections "may generate 'market power' in some abstract sense, they do not justify the
kind of market power that justifies condemning tying." 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984); see also Tovm
Sound & Custom Tops v. Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d 468, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1992) (acknowl
edging the relevance of imperfect information and other market failures, but concluding that
institutional considerations caution against using antitrust laws to correct a variety of "con
sumer protection" issues). In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., how
ever, the Court was greatly influenced by the effects of information failures in the market for
high-end photocopying equipment, and in the aftermarket for Kodak parts and service.
"For the service-market price to affect equipment demand, consumers must inform them
selves of the total cost of the 'package' - equipment, service, and parts - at the time of
purchase; that is consumers must engage in accurate lifecyle pricing." 504 U.S. 451, 473
(1992). The inability to engage in life-cycle pricing was critical to the Court's finding of
market power on the part of Kodak. It is difficult to reconcile the Court's teachings in
Jefferson Parish and Kodak. See Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect In
formation: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services
and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336, 357 (1993) ("The ap
proaches of Kodak and Jefferson Parish to the role of informational imperfections in market
power analysis cannot be reconciled."). But see Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 459, 484-85 (attempting to reconcile Jefferson Parish and Kodak in terms of deter
mining when imperfect information can generate market power for tying purposes by fo
cusing on whether the informational difficulties were exacerbated by the entity charged with
having market power).
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increase in total welfare (static efficiency). Standard reporting for
mats can make markets function more effectively by decreasing con
sumer search costs and increasing competition between producers.
The result may be reductions in price or increased levels of quality and
service. These welfare gains would have to be balanced against anti
competitive risks, such as the increased risk of collusion. Here, the
concern is making sure that the agreement is focused on the format for
conveying information and not on substantive terms of the transac
tion. There do not appear to be serious dynamic efficiency concerns,
although judges should be aware of the possibility that disclosure re
quirements can potentially create or increase barriers of entry. Addi
tionally, disclosure requirements are not always benign. There is often
a tendency for competitive energies to be channeled into the catego
ries being reported to consumers. Finally, courts should inquire into
the possibility of achieving similar welfare benefits through less re
strictive means.
As one moves from cases that can fit under existing rule-of-reason
analysis to cases that would require express doctrinal recognition of an
intramarket second-best defense - typically cases involving a more
direct challenge to established presumptions of anticompetitive effects
- one can envision similar types of economic theories and empirical
evidence that could be used to satisfy the requirements of the affirma
tive defense. The more novel the claim, however, the more skeptical
the factfinder should be in considering the arguments.
The making of an intramarket second-best defense is perhaps most
clearly illustrated in the context of negative externalities. Assume that
defendants are cigarette manufacturers charged with forming a cartel
to fix the price of cigarettes (or potentially agreeing to a merger that
violates section 7 of the Clayton Act).98 A prima facie antitrust viola.
The affirmative defense for intramarket second·best tradeoffs avoids a number of these
problems. Under a total welfare standard, the market failures acknowledged in Jefferson
Parish and Kodak would both be relevant, but the inquiry would focus on the relationship
between the informational market failure, the alleged restraint, and total welfare. The diffi
culties the courts are having conducting rule-of-reason analysis in markets characterized by
imperfect information suggest some of the limitations of existing doctrine, which focuses on
an abstract balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects. They also suggest that rule-of
reason analysis might be improved if it adopted portions of the framework developed here
to examine intramarket second-best tradeoffs. Is the restraint responsive to an identifiable
market failure? Will the conduct increase total welfare? Axe there dynamic efficiency con
cerns? Is there a less restrictive alternative?

98. Some people may object to the cigarette example because it permits tobacco com
panies that are already causing substantial public health harms to benefit from the windfall
of monopoly profits. The argument in favor of taxing away such cigarette profits may indeed
be strong. Nevertheless, the deeper insight of being able to use market structure as a means
of correcting negative externalities should not be lost. One can imagine cases where permit
ting producers to earn monopoly rents as a means of correcting externalities would not strike
people as morally objectionable. For example, assume two timber companies are logging a
national forest. For political and other reasons, they are not paying the full social costs of
their logging, which means that their customers are buying lumber "too cheaply." If they
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tion would be established by documenting the existence of an agree
ment to fix prices (or defining the market and documenting concentra
tion ratios that trigger a presumption of illegality). The defendants
would be able to rebut the presumption of a merger's illegality if they
were able to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence the fol
lowing contentions. First, the existence of a market failure - ciga
rettes impose substantial negative externalities because the social costs
of smoking (increased Medicare and Medicaid expenses, harm of sec
ond-hand smoke, etc.) exceed the private cost of cigarettes to consum
ers as reflected in the prevailing market price, including government
taxes. Second, the cartel price (or the increased market price associ
ated with increased market power from the merger) would result in a
net increase in total welfare (static efficiency). This argument could
be made with expert economic testimony employing arguments and
analysis similar to those explored in Section I.B.1 and illustrated in
figure 2
the higher price associated with the otherwise anticompeti
tive conduct moves society closer to the "price equals marginal social
cost" equilibrium.99
Third, the defendants would have to prove that the cartel (or
merger) would not structurally impair the ability of private or public
actors subsequently to ameliorate the effects of the market failure
(dynamic efficiency).100 The concern over dynamic efficiency is a safe-

merged and attained some degree of market power, the price of their lumber goes up, pro
duction falls, negative externalities are diminished, and customers are paying closer to the
full social costs of what they buy. Permitting the lumber companies to retain the profits does
not strike me as morally objectionable, particularly in light of the increase in total welfare.
This example also illustrates why a total welfare standard is not only more efficient, but may
also be more fair than a consumer surplus standard, at least in cases of negative externalities.
After the merger, the price of lumber is raised from a level that is "too cheap" to a level that
more closely approximates the social costs of the timber. Titls reduces consumer surplus, but
on these facts the consumer surplus represents the ill-gotten gains of over-exploiting the for
ests.
99. See Gulbrandsen & Skeath, supra note 31, at 9-15 (calculating the welfare effects of
different market structures given the presence of negative externalities). The authors also
consider the welfare effects of the government's1911 antitrust breakup of the American To
bacco Company. Under monopoly conditions, the price of cigarettes was higher and output
was lower than under competition. After the 1911 breakup, output increased. "In the two
years following the 1911 breakup, output nearly doubled from its 1909 level." Id. at 4. The
authors conclude that "it is certainly possible that leaving the American Tobacco Company
untouched by antitrust action may have been in the best interest of American consumers and
their families." Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
100. Dynamic efficiency concerns will be difficult to operationalize. The third element
calls upon courts to engage in forms of comparative institutional analysis. Both Greaney
and Brodley acknowledge similar concerns in their advocacy of a market failure defense.
See Brodley, supra note 21, at 104 7-48 ("The existence of market failure indicates the need
for regulation, but does not resolve whether the regulation should be public or private.");
Greaney, supra note 7 7, at 630 ("Titls precedent militates in favor of conditioning the market
failure defense on a showing that private ordering is superior to public regulation."). My
intramarket second-best defense favors concurrent and competing public and private efforts
to address market failures. The evaluation of dynamic efficiency is primarily concerned with
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guard against anticompetitive conduct that produces a short-term in
crease in total welfare but that prevents more effective initiatives in
the future.101 In the cigarette example, such structural concerns are
unlikely. A cartel is not likely to impede the ability of federal or state
governments to impose future taxes that would compel smokers to in
ternalize the effects of the externalities.102 Indeed, on these facts, the
disclosure required by the first element of the defense is likely to in
vite government action.103 Finally, the defendants would have to prove
that there is not a less restrictive private alternative to the restraint.
The focus here is on the actions more consistent with the antitrust laws
that the defendants could undertake to address the market failure.
For example, under certain circumstances, a joint venture might be
less restrictive than a complete merger. On these facts, a price fixing
agreement may be less restrictive than a merger.
Hospital nonprice competition provides another useful illustration.
Defendant hospitals would first have to document the many market
failures that frustrate active price competition and encourage various
forms of nonprice competition.104 Second, the hospitals would have to
prove that merging would result in a net increase in social welfare
avoiding private action that will substantially increase the cost of subsequent public or pri
vate responses to the underlying market failures.
101. Many unusual situations can be envisioned in assessing dynamic efficiency. Courts
may be faced with competing private initiatives to correct the same or related market fail
ures. In the tradition of second-best analysis, the welfare effects of these initiatives may vary
depending upon whether they are viewed in isolation or in combination. Sinillarly, courts
may be confronted with serial private efforts of an identical nature that may have different
welfare effects. Some of these issues will be difficult to resolve in practice. My intention
here, however, is to present a skeletal outline of the affirmative defense. The particular de
tails of the analysis can be fleshed out as concrete problems arise. The rubric of "dynamic
efficiency," however, should be flexible enough to permit courts to evaluate both actual and
hypothetical competing public and private initiatives in whatever permutations seem appro
priate.
102. It is conceivable that a merger or the formation of a cartel could facilitate private
actors' ability to block future innovations such as the introduction of safer low-tar or low
nicotine alternatives. At the same time, the higher prices attributable to increased market
power are likely to make smoking alternatives (cessation programs or safer cigarettes) rela
tively more attractive to some consumers. Also, in industries like cigarettes, one may need
to be concerned about the effects that branding and advertising may have on subsequent
entry into the market
103. While it is possible that the judge's decision in a particular case could itself influ
ence the likelihood of responsive political action, either in a positive or negative direction, I
do not view this as an appropriate consideration under dynamic efficiency analysis. The fo
cus should remain on a structural evaluation of whether the private conduct being approved
would make it more costly to implement a public alternative in the future. While not part of
the judicial analysis, the potential political backlash associated with the types of public dis
closures required by the first element - admitting the negative and often deadly effects of
smoking - is likely to serve as a serious deterrent to cigarette companies invoking the de
fense.
104. See Greaney, supra note 77 (discussing health care market failures); see also supra
text accompanying notes 45-46 (discussing effects of market failures on price and nonprice
competition).
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(static efficiency). Unfortunately, unlike the case of the negative price
externalities, there is no simple diagram that illustrates the costs of
nonprice competition. Defendants could rely upon cross-sectional
studies of the effects of market power and economic concentration
upon medical expenses.ms Additionally, the hospitals could introduce
evidence that the costs of providing nonprice amenities exceed the so
cial value of the attribute as measured by the individual consumer's
willingness to pay for such unbundled options.m5 If the hospitals could
show that reductions in competition increase total welfare and result
in a more efficient distribution of resources, then the second element
would be satisfied.
Third, the hospitals would have to show that a merger would not
structurally undermine the ability of public or private actors subse
quently to address the underlying market failures (dynamic effi
ciency). There are legitimate dynamic efficiency concerns in hospital
markets. Mergers both increase the level of economic concentration
and decrease the number of actors in the market. As such, hospital
mergers threaten to undermine two alternative responses to the mar
ket failures triggering nonprice competition. The first response is the
private restructuring of the firms providing health care - integrating
the functions of financing and delivery - as witnessed by the rise of
managed care plans.107 The second response is the introduction of
greater levels of bidding and selective contracting by large employers
and by government-sponsored Medicare and Medicaid programs.ms
Both of these responses could be undermined by substantial increases
in economic concentration at the hospital level. Thus, permitting the
merger of hospitals in traditionally structured markets in order to
counteract the effects of nonprice competition provides an example of
conduct that may be statically efficient (resulting in a short-term in
crease in total welfare) but is dynamically inefficient (structurally un
dermining the ability of public and private actors to address subse
quently the underlying market failures).109. So to establish the defense,

105. See studies cited
health care markets).

supra note 44 (empirical studies of the effects of competition in

106. See discussion supra note 43 and accompanying text (using consumer willingness to
pay for a series of unbundled options as a benchmark for assessing the social value of non
price attributes).
107. See Hammer, supra note 45 (examining the changing structure of health care mar
kets in terms of a Coasian transformation of the firms providing health care services and fi.
nancing).
108. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reforms in Health Care: The Vulnerable
Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179, 185-87 (1988) (discussing the role of selective contract·
ing in overcoming health care market failures).

109. See Hammer, supra note 45 (arguing that dynamic efficiency concerns should lead
to the rejection of hospital mergers in those markets capable of making a successful transi·
tion from the Old to the Emerging Regime).
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merging hospitals would have to show that these solutions were un
likely to emerge in their market in the foreseeable future.
Finally, to complete their intramarket second-best defense, the
hospitals would have to demonstrate that there was not a less restric
tive alternative to merger. Joint ventures for specific new technologies
and the conscious splitting of service menus or allocation of the mar
ket may be less restrictive strategies.
An affirmative defense for intramarket second-best tradeoffs
raises unsettled doctrinal questions and practical concerns. Practical
concerns, such as the ability of courts to litigate second-best tradeoffs,
are examined in Part TI. The doctrinal issues associated with second
best tradeoffs and a total welfare standard are examined in Part III.
II.

THE VIABILITY OF AN lNTRAMARKET SECOND-BEST DEFENSE:
THEORETICAL INTEGRITY, ABILITY TO LmGATE, AND
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

It is one thing to assert that courts should assess intramarket
second-best tradeoffs in light of a total welfare standard as a theoreti
cal matter. It is quite another matter to contend that courts are capa
ble of implementing such an approach in the context of litigation. The
affirmative defense proposed in this Article incorporates a total wel
fare standard far more expressly than is currently recognized in anti
trust law. To establish the viability of a total welfare standard, a num
ber of propositions must be defended.
Economic theories of
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total welfare must be able to
provide a sound basis for decisionmaking. Moreover, it must be pos
sible to translate these economic theories into the legal setting, by
providing both the technical information and the intuitive framework
necessary for deciding cases.
A.

The Underpinnings of Total Welfare: Understanding
Consumer Surplus

Consumer surplus plays a central role in welfare analysis.11° At its
most basic level, individual consumer surplus is the monetary differ
ence between the amount a person pays for a good or service and the
maximum amount he would be willing to pay for that same good or
service.111 For example, if I send an agent to bid at auction for a rare

110. Economists reading this Article may wish to skip to infra notes 121-122 and accom
panying text, for what follows is a discussion of some basic economic principles for the gen
eral reader.
111. See FRANK CAMM, CONSUMER SURPLUS, DEMAND FUNCTIONS, AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 1 (1983) ("Consumer Surplus is a monetary measure of the difference between
what an individual pays for consuming a good or service and the amount he is willing to pay,
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Cambodian sculpture and authorize my agent to bid up to a level that
reflects my valuation of the art work, my consumer surplus would be
the difference between the amount of my winning bid (assuming I am
successful in my efforts) and the higher amount I had authorized my
agent to bid (my willingness to pay). Consumer surplus at a market
level is simply the aggregation of individual consumer surpluses. We
can envision this (subject to a number of caveats) as the area between
the market demand curve and the prevailing market price for any
given commodity (see figure 1).112 This is essentially the approach
adopted by Alfred Marshall who popularized the concept in his 1890
text Principles ofEconomics.113
Policymakers are frequently concerned about the impact of differ
ent actions on consumer surplus. Take, for example, an increase in
price. Marshall, in calculating the change in consumer surplus, holds
the individual's income constant, assuming that the change in relative
prices has no income effects. At the higher price, the individual con
sumes less of the good. This lower level of consumption reduces the
individual's utility because he presumably gains benefits from having
more of the good, for otherwise he would not have purchased it, what
ever its price. The change in consumer surplus is the difference be
tween benefits (utility) the consumer enjoyed before and after the
price increase. Measuring those benefits in monetary terms, the dif
ference can be approximated by the area to the left of the Marshallian
demand curve between the two price levels.114

See generally E J. MISHAN, WHAT POLmCAL
ECONOMY Is ALL ABOUT: AN EXPOSmON AND CRITIQUE 69-82 (1982).

given his income and the prices he faces.").

.

112. Camm notes that the characterization of consumer surplus as the "area under the
demand curve" is appropriate "only if (a) the good in question has no close substitutes or
complements or (b) consumer prices for all other goods are fixed." CAMM, supra note 111,
at vii. "For practical purposes, consumer surplus is not the area under the demand curve: It is
the sum ofareas to the left ofthe consumption locL" Id. Another difficulty in characterizing
consumer surplus as the area under the demand curve is that different measures of consumer
surplus envision the usage of different types of demand functions. See id. at 28-29.
113. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 175, 429, 446-55, 465-72 (1890).
114. Changes in individual utility can be translated into exact monetary values via the
demand function, given Marshall's method of deriving consumer demand directly from con
sumer utility. See Peter C. Dooley, Consumer's Surplus: Marshall and His Critics, 6
CANADIAN J. ECON. 26, 27 (1983). Marshallian demand curves and his analysis of consumer
surplus can be controversial. Dooley summarizes the major categories of criticisms that have
been levied against Marshall:
[F]irst, whether an additive utility function adequately explains consumer behavior; second,
whether the marginal utility of money can be treated as a constant; third, whether the quan
tity demanded of one commodity can be treated as a function of its price alone; and fourth,
whether it is possible to make interpersonal comparisons.
at 28. He elaborates on each of these critiques. See id. at 28-35; see also Robert B.
Ekelund & Robert F. Hebert, Consumer Surplus: The First Hundred Years, 17 HIST. POL.
ECON. 419, 435-39, 445-47 (1985) (discussing historical and modem critiques of Marshall's
theory of consumer surplus); Edward R. Morey, Confuser Surplus, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 163

Id.
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A serious limitation of Marshall's analysis is his assumption that
price changes have no income effects. Empirically, this assumption is
most problematic when the good in question accounts for a large share
of an individual's expenditures, or when consumption of the good it
self is highly sensitive to fluctuations in personal income. Hicksian
measures of consumer surplus attempt to address these considerations.
Hicks introduced two alternative measures to assess changes in con
sumer surplus: the Hicksian compensating variation and the Hicksian
equivalent variation.115 The compensating variation asks, when there
is a price increase, how much money would be required to return the
individual to his pre-price-increase level of utility.116 The equivalent
variation asks what reduction in income would be required to reduce
the individual's utility to the same degree as the increase in price.117
Phrased slightly differently, the compensating variation asks what
monetary transfer would be required to compensate fully the individ
ual for the effects of the price increase and return him to his original
level of utility (albeit in a world with higher prices). The equivalent
variation asks how much the individual would be willing to pay in or
der to avoid the effects of the price increase (prices are unchanged in
this variation, but the individual loses income and hence utility).118
While closely related in approach, the compensating and the equiva
lent variations will usually produce different monetary measures of
changes in consumer surplus.119 Moreover, the Hicksian and Marshal
lian measures will yield different assessments of the impact of various
policies on consumer surplus.120
Although subject to numerous technical refinements and profes
sional debate, the notion of consumer surplus possesses a relatively
simple and intuitive core. At its heart, Marshall's consumer surplus is
the difference between the actual price charged and an individual's

(1984) (questioning whether dollar measures of individual utility exist that would permit a
measure of preference intensity and interpersonal comparisons).
115. For expositions of the Hicksian measures of consumer surplus, see CAMM, supra
111, at 6-7, and Ekelund & Hebert, supra note 114, at 440-43. See also KREPS, supra
5, at 58-59; VARIAN, supra note 4, § 15.4.

note
note

116. See CAMM, supra note 111, at 7 ("[W]e can ask how much the individual's income
would have to be raised following the price change to achieve the level of utility he enjoyed
before the price change.").
117. See id. ("[W]e
price change does.").

can

ask what cut in income will hurt the individual as much as the

118. See id. at 9-10 (graphic and textual illustrations).
119. See id.

at 25-26 n.2 ("When the price of a normal good changes, compensating
variation exceed equivalent variation if the price raises; the reverse holds if price falls.").
120. For comparisons of the Hicksian and Marshallian approaches, see id. at 28-29, and
Jerry A. Hausman, Exact Consumer's Surplus and Deadweight Loss, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
662 (1981). For an illustration of the differences these approaches yield in measuring the
deadweight loss, see CAMM, supra note 111, at 63-64, and Hausman, supra, at 672-73.
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willingness to pay. More refined Hicksian notions of consumer sur
plus also invite introspection in which most people can engage. How
much money would be necessary to undo the harm of an adverse
event, such as an increase in prices, or how much money would an in
dividual be willing to pay to avoid a price increase (or other adverse
event)?
These concepts resonate closely with common law calculations that
ordinary jurors perform on a routine basis. Expectation damages in
contract cases are designed to protect an individual's benefit of the
bargain.121 In calculating and awarding expectation damages, jurors
are essentially awarding the nonbreaching party their "surplus" asso
ciated with the contract. Similarly, compensatory damages in torts
perform the same basic calculation envisioned by Hicksian compen
sating variations. The objective is to provide damages (a money
award) that attempt to return the plaintiff to the same level of well
being (utility) that he enjoyed before the tort. These calculations are
not necessarily easy to make, nor does the judicial system always get
them right, but the common law analogies tell us that the calculations
can be reduced to intuitions ordinary jurors and judges can use with
levels of accuracy and effectiveness deemed acceptable in other im
portant areas of law.122 Additional examples of relatively complicated
economic assessments being operationalized at an intuitive level can
be found in the assessment of negligence in tort cases, the reasonable
person standard, and forms of cost-benefit analysis or balancing tests
used throughout the law. I point these out because they tend to ne-

121. The example of expectation damages focuses on individual rather than aggregate
consumer surplus. My point, however, is not that ordinary citizens can be expected to cal
culate aggregate consumer surplus, but rather that the central notions can be made intuitive
and individually accessible. Intuitive juror understanding will not be a substitute for expert
economic testimony, but it means that properly done, there is an effective foundation for the
economist's testimony and the lawyer's argument.
122. To be persuasive, the common law analogy to torts and contracts must also exam
ine whether there are any acceptable institutional substitutes for, or superior alternatives to,
these common law regimes. The ability to litigate a standard is a necessary but insufficient
condition for adopting a standard. "Can" and "should" raise separate issues. Whether a
standard "should" be litigated raises questions of comparative institutional analysis. With
market failures and intramarket second-best tradeoffs, for example, regulatory substitutes
may be available that are not available for torts and contracts. Furthermore, administrative
agencies may have a comparative advantage in determining consumer surplus and total wel
fare. Consequently, it might make sense to entrust juries with the calculation of tort and
contract damages, but not to entrust antitrust juries with calculating consumer surplus.
While the present Section focuses on whether consumer surplus "can" be operationalized,
the question of whether it "should" be adopted is strengthened by the realization that anti
trust law supplies default rules for private markets that can be trumped by federal and state
regulatory initiatives if regulation has a strong comparative advantage. Moreover, the third
element of the affirmative defense (dynamic efficiency), outlined supra Section I.D, seeks to
permit private action only in those cases in which it would not substantially impair the ability
of subsequent efforts to address the underlying market failures. I am grateful to Louis
Kaplow for his comments highlighting potential differences between common law and regu
latory assessments in this area.
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gate an obvious objection to my scheme: namely, that jurors and
judges will be unable to make the calculations it calls for. While these
calculations are not the same as the ones in these examples, they relate
to notions of personal and economic well-being and are often at a
similar level of complexity.
B.

Theory into Practice: Litigating Second-Best Claims

While intuitively grounded, theories of consumer surplus are also
capable of being operationalized in a manner that can facilitate tech
nical decisionmaking. Econometricians used to be faced with a di
lemma. Marshallian demand is observable and may be roughly calcu
lated from information on actual consumer purchases at different
price levels.123 Hicksian compensated demand curves, which attempt
to account for the income effects of price changes, are not observ
able,124 yet it is generally believed that Hicksian demand curves pro
vide more defensible estimates of changes in consumer surplus.125 This
is because they incorporate the income effects that are associated with
the change in relative prices. The old dilemma was between use of an
easier to estimate but less accurate Marshallian measure, or a more
difficult to calculate but more accurate Hicksian measure.
Fortunately, this dilemma no longer is a serious obstacle in most
cases. Robert Willig has demonstrated that calculations of Marshal
lian consumer surplus based upon market demand functions often
provide good approximations of either Hicksian measure.126 More im-

123. See CAMM, supra note 111, at 37 ("Only one of these - the Marshallian - is a be
havioral function in the sense that it describes actual behavior in the absence of the forms of
compensation envisioned in the other measures.").
124. See id. at 64 ("Hick's . . . functions are hypothetical functions that must be inferred
from the Marshallian functions we can observe directly in the absence of compensation.").
125. In his treatment of the efficiency defense, Williamson relied upon Marshallian de
mand curves and Marshall's notion of consumer surplus. See Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense, supra note 66, at 22 n.4; Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra note 66,
at 708 n.28. Fisher & Lande subsequently levied the standard critique that, for "accurate
measurement of deadweight losses and consumer/producer surplus, one must perform wel
fare analysis using income-compensated, or Hicksian, demand curves." Fisher & Lande,
supra note 23, at 1629 n.176.
126. See Robert Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON REV. 589
(1976); see also CAMM, supra note 111, at 62 ("Willig has quantified the divergence of meas
ures based on the Marshallian and Hicksian curves in terms of income elasticities and factor
shares for arbitrary functional forms. Where these numbers are not large, his technique may
prove useful in moving from one measure of consumer surplus to another."); Hausman, su
pra note 120, at 662 ("Robert Willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between
the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the Marshallian
measure derived from the market demand curve. His bounds . . . demonstrate that the
Marshallian consumer's surplus is often a good approximation to Hicks' consumer's sur
plus. . . . Thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need
to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using Marshallian consumer's
surplus to measure welfare change.").
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portantly, Jerry Hausman has illustrated a technique by which it is
possible to derive Hicksian compensated demand functions from ob
servable market demand and to directly estimate Hicksian compen
sated and equivalent variations.127 Thus, theoretical and applied eco
nomics now provide a set of tools that make it possible to litigate
issues such as the likely effect of changes in market structure, or con
duct on consumer prices and hence consumer surplus.128 Obviously,
consumer surplus constitutes only one part of the total welfare puzzle,
but it is an essential component that must fall into place if antitrust law
is to move in the direction of adopting a total welfare orientation.
Recent developments in the assessment of the unilateral effects of
merger in markets with differentiated products further illustrate the
ability of economists to operationalize sophisticated antitrust theories
that require estimations of actual consumer demand.129 At least since
the 1992 Joint Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines, antitrust enforcement agencies have treated seri
ously the possibility of anticompetitive effects flowing unilaterally
from mergers.130 Unilateral effects are anticompetitive effects that can

127. See Hausman, supra note 120, at 663 ("The basic idea used in deriving the exact
measure of consumer's surplus is to use the observed market demand curve to derive the
unobserved compensated demand curve. It is this latter demand curve which leads to the
compensating variation and the equivalent variation.''); see also Robert H. Haveman et al.,
Exact Consumer's Surplus and Deadweight Loss: A Correction, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 494

(1987).
128. See

CAMM, supra note 111, at 1 ("The current theoretical literature on consumer
surplus and social welfare measures seems to be reaching a consensus that well defined
('path-independent') measures of changes in consumer surplus based on Hicksian income
compensated demand functions can be developed strictly as functions of observable data on
quantities and prices.'').

129. See Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis,
1997, at 21; Thomas Overstreet et al., Understanding Econometric

ANTITRUST, Spring

Analysis of the Price Effects of Mergers Involving Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST,
Summer 1996, at 30; Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Spring
1996, at 23; Christopher A. Vellturo, Evaluating Mergers with Differentiated Products,
ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 16; Gregory J. Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Ef
fects from Differentiated Products Mergers, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 27. For more tech
nical assessments of the economic issues raised by unilateral market effects, see Jonathan
Baker & Timothy F. Bresnaltan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single
Firm, 6 INT'L J. INDUS. ORO. 283 (1988); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Eco
nomic Analysis ofDifferentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 321 (1997); Jerry Hausman et al., Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products,
34 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 159 (1994); Jerry A. Hausman et al., A Pro

posed Method for Analyzing Competition Among Differentiated Products, 60 .ANTITRUST
L.J. 889 (1992); Gregory J. Werden, Simulating Effects of Differentiated Products Mergers:
A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363 (1997);
Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Testfor Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers
ofDifferentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409 (1996); and Gregory J. Werden & Luke
M. Froeb, The Effects of Merger in Differentiated Products and Industries: Logit Demand
and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 407 (1994).

4

130. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice & U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n Horizantal Merger Guidelines,
(CCH) CJ[ 13,104 (§ 2.211) (Apr. 7, 1992) (hereinafter DOJ and FTC

Trade Reg. Rep.

Merger Guidelines]. The examination of unilateral effects can be contrasted with the tradi-
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occur without any combination or collusion with nonmerging parties.
Adverse unilateral effects are most likely to occur in markets with dif
ferentiated products where the merging parties' products are per
ceived to be the first and second choices for a significant segment of
consumers. If Product A (let us call it M&Ms) and Product B (let us
call it Reese's Pieces) are a consumer's first and second choices, and
each are independently produced (by Mars and Hershey), one of the
constraints Mars faces in deciding whether to charge more for M&Ms
is fear of lost sales (and profits) to Hershey, which will sell more
Reese's Pieces.131 The fraction of M&Ms sales that are lost to Reese's
Pieces is defined as the "diversion ratio."132 If Mars and Hershey
merge, however, the diverted sales are not "lost" to Mars-Hershey and
no longer serve to deter potential price increases for M&Ms.
One approach to estimating the adverse unilateral effects of a
merger is to specify a full system of demand and supply equations and
to measure the "own" and "cross" elasticities for all of the relevant
products and producers.133 The ability to specify the appropriate de
mand and supply equations depends on the availability and adequacy
of the underlying data. In practice, such data are becoming increas
ingly available with improved computerized records and machine
scanned retail sales.134 With these data in hand, numerous techniques
are available for economists to specify the appropriate demand sys
tem.135 Once a system of equations is specified, enforcement agency

tional merger analysis of coordinated effects reflected in the problem of collusion. Unilat
eral effects can occur in the absence of any collusion and under the assumption that all
members of the industry continue to act in an independent and individually profit-maximiz
ing fashion.

131. See Shapiro, supra note 129, at 24-25; Vellturo, supra note 129, at 16-17.
("The Diversion Ratio of Product A to Product
B is defined as the portion of sales the producer of Product A would lose on Product A as a
result of a price increase on Product A . . . •") .

132 See Vellturo, supra note 129, at 17

133. See Overstreet et al., supra note 129, at 31. Vellturo terms this type of approach
"structural demand analysis." Vellturo, supra note 129, at 16.
134. See Shapiro, supra note 129, at 25; see also Hausman & Leonard, supra note 129, at
325 (describing how Nielsen retail scanner data can be used to estimate consumer demand
and calculate own and cross price elasticities of various products). The systematic collection
and subsequent sampling of retail scanner data makes it possible to obtain fairly accurate
estimates of consumer demand for those products sold and tracked with bar codes. See id.

135. Vellturo summarizes some of the approaches that have been taken to "structural
demand analysis":
The approaches to structural demand analysis include the AIDS Model (Hausman, Leonard
& Zona), the Antitrust Logit Simulation Model (Froeb & Werden), and the Residual De
mand Elasticity Model (Baker). All three methods within this line provide sufficient struc
ture to estimate (or, at least, simulate) the price effect of the proposed transaction . . . . All
three are also highly data-intensive: the models require detailed price and sales data for the
merging products (AIDS Model); price and sales data on the merging products and detailed
industry-specific and product-specific cost data (Residual Demand Elasticity Model); or
market share, and pre-determined elasticity estimates (Antitrust Logit Model).
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economists can, and now do, run simulations to estimate the likely
price effects of a merger.136 The task is complicated. In addition to
specifying the supply and demand equations and calculating the ap
propriate diversion ratios, to do a complete analysis it is necessary to
formally model and evaluate likely competitor reactions in the form of
new entry or the repositioning of product lines, as well as to factor in
any likely efficiency gains that could change the cost structure of the
merging firms and increase productive efficiency. But this is also now
being done.137 It is a short step from completing this type of analysis to
assessing the impact of merger on consumer surplus and total wel
fare.13s
Vellturo, supra note 129, at 16 (referring to Hausman et al., Competitive Analysis with Dif
ferentiated Products, supra note 129 (AIDS Model), Werden & Froeb, supra note 129 (Anti
trust Logit Model), and Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 129 (Residual Demand Model)).
For further discussion of each of these techniques, see Overstreet et al., supra note 129, at
31-33.

This literature includes a handful of examples where the authors apply their models to
particular markets to assess the likely unilateral effects of mergers. See Baker & Bresnahan,
supra note 129, at 290-98 (calculating the residual demand elasticities for three producers of
domestic beer - Anheuser-Busch, Pabst, and Coors); Hausman et al., Competitive Analysis
with Differentiated Products, supra note 129, at 162-72 (illustration estimating consumer de
mand for beer and calculating the own and cross price elasticities for various brands);
Hausman & Leonard, supra note 129, at 335-36 (examining the market for bath tissue, esti
mating consumer demand, calculating own and cross price elasticities, and predicting the
unilateral price effects of a merger between Kimberley-Clark and Scott); Werden & Froeb,
supra note 129, at 417-20 (simulating the welfare effects of various hypothetical mergers
amongst U.S. long distance carriers using the antitrust logit model, data of the relevant mar
ket shares, and estimated demand elasticities).
136. There are less technical and less data-intensive approaches to assessing the likely
unilateral effects of merger. These methods center on obtaining accurate estimates of the
diversion ratio as a means of determining the degree to which the pre-merged parties served
as deterrents to unilateral price increases. These techniques include switching studies,
winfloss reports, and end user surveys. See Shapiro, supra note 129, at 25; Vellturo, supra
note 129, at 18-19. These techniques can be employed when data or technical restrictions
prevent full structural demand analysis.
137. Shapiro outlines a four step process in unilateral effects analysis: (1) calculation of
the diversion ratio; (2) estimation of the likely post-merger price increase assuming no reac
tions by competitors and no synergies to the merging parties; (3) accounting for the likely
strategic reaction of competitors; and (4) accounting for any likely cost-reducing effects of
the merger. See Shapiro, supra note 129, at 24. The primary forms of strategic reaction by
competitors consist of new entry into the market or the repositioning of products by existing
competitors. See id. at 27-28. An assessment of synergies would include any cost savings or
efficiencies attributable to the merger. See id. at 28.
138. Werden outlines the steps of simulating the effects of mergers and assessing unilat
eral price effects. These steps include calibrating the demand system, estimating marginal
costs, and calculating post-merger prices and outputs. See Werden, Simulating Unilateral
Competitive Effects from Differentiated Products Mergers, supra note 129, at 28. Werden
also corrects for entry and efficiency concerns. See id. All of these tools permit the en
forcement agencies to assess the impact of the proposed merger on total welfare.
One reason for undertaking merger simulation is that it permits a quantitative trade-off, or
netting out, of efficiencies against the price-increasing effects of internalizing competition
between the merging firms. • • . It is also possible to determine the net effect of a merger on
total economic welfare, which includes the profits of the firms.

Id.
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It is still too early to assess the impact that the economic theories
and econometric techniques underlying the unilateral effects analysis
will have on antitrust enforcement, counseling, and litigation. To date,
most such analyses have been employed internally, by enforcement
agencies deciding whether to permit or challenge transactions. Testi
mony reporting similar work has, however, been used in litigation and
relied upon by courts in reviewing the legality of mergers.139 While the
doctrinal issues raised by unilateral effects are substantially less
threatening to traditional antitrust approaches than those posed by in
tramarket second-best tradeoffs, many of the tools used in assessing
the claims are mostly similar, both in terms of economic substance and
in terms of the complexity of the analysis.
Two preliminary lessons can be drawn. First, the economic tools
and legal sophistication required to litigate claims predicated on speci
fying complete systems of supply and demand equations and estimat-

139. See Shapiro, supra note 129, at 29 (citing New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926
F. Supp. 321, 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'JI 70,911 {S.D.N.Y. 1995), and United States v.
Gillete, 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993)). The district courts in both Kraft and Gillette re
jected the unilateral effects arguments, not as a doctrinal matter, but on the facts before the
court. In Kraft, the State of New York challenged Kraft's acquisition of Nabisco's ready-to
eat breakfast cereal assets. An important part of the State's case was the alleged unilateral
price effects the merger would have on specific brands. In particular, the State maintained
that the acquisition would permit Kraft to raise the price of its Post Grape-Nuts product,
given that it would no longer fear losing sales and profits to the newly acquired Nabisco
Shredded Wheat product In a lengthy opinion, the court examined issues of market defini
tion, market shares, traditional coordinated or collusive effects of the acquisition, and the
alleged unilateral effects of the transaction. As a factual matter, the court found that Grape
Nuts and Shredded Wheat were not sufficiently close substitutes, and that each faced compe
tition from an array of other products. See 926 F. Supp. at 352-53. The court credited the
defendant's economic expert Professor Daniel Rubenfeld, who testified that an increase in
the price of Grape-Nuts would lead to only a very small increase in the sales of Nabisco
Shredded Wheat cereals. See 926 F. Supp. at 356. The court concluded that "it would not be
profitable for Kraft to raise the price of Grape-Nuts in the expectation that a substantial por
tion of its lost sales would go to Nabisco Shredded Wheat, because it is likely that the lost
sales would be dispersed among a wide variety of products, and that Nabisco Shredded
Wheat would gain only a small percentage of those losses. The State has failed to prove its
claim of adverse unilateral effects." 926 F. Supp. at 366.
In Gillette, the government sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Gillette's proposed
acquisition of Parker. The government challenged the deal because of alleged adverse uni
lateral effects in the premium fountain pen market - refillable fountain pens with a retail
price between $50 and $400. The district court rejected the argument. "[T]here is ample
evidence that the merged company will not be able to increase prices on premium fountain
pens unilaterally." 828 F. Supp. at 84. According to the court, fountain pens compete with
other modes of writing. In essence, the court held that the diversion ration between
Gillette's and Parker's premium fountain pens was not high. Finally, the court reasoned that
there were no substantial barriers to entry, permitting new companies to enter the market or
permitting existing companies to reposition their existing product lines in response to a uni
lateral price increase.
The fact that the plaintiffs in these cases were not successful on the merits does not in
validate the legitimacy of unilateral effects theory, nor does it call into question the ability of
the courts to implement these approaches. While potentially complicated, these issues can
be litigated and resolved in much the same manner as other complex problems in antitrust
cases.
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ing the welfare effects of proposed mergers or other restraints exist
and are being employed. Second, whether or not the defense of in
tramarket second-best tradeoffs is embraced, antitrust lawyers and
judges will continue to confront increasingly complex economic theo
ries and econometric techniques. That being said, it is important that
the use of theory not outstrip the policy framework and heuristics nec
essary to filter the economic information and process the statistical
output. Antitrust law is not a forum to test the limits of economic the
ory. The theory must fit in an appropriate doctrinal setting and it
must be administrable within the context of litigation, which is predi
cated upon a system of lay factfinders.
C.

Cost-Benefit Analysis and Balancing Error Types

The desirability of an affirmative defense for intramarket second
best tradeoffs can be assessed in terms of traditional cost-benefit
analysis.14° The social welfare gains from permitting otherwise pro
hibited business arrangements under contemporary antitrust doctrine
are the primary benefits of allowing the defense. Social welfare losses
from mistakenly approving welfare-impairing conduct that would have
been prohibited but for the affirmative defense, and private and social
litigation expenses, are the primary costs.141

140. For alternative formulations of cost-benefit rules assessing antitrust standards, see
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 16 ("The legal system should be designed to minimize the total
costs of (1) anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; (2) competitive practices
that are condemned or deterred; and (3) the system itself."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Work
able Antitmst Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1711 (1986) ("Overreaching the limits of adju
dication will increase the rate of error. We want to hold to a mininlum the sum of the costs
of harmful activity wrongly condoned and useful activity wrongfully condemned (or discour
aged)." (footnote omitted)); Fisher & Lande, supra note 23, at 1670-71 (stressing the need to
consider type one errors, type two errors, and type three errors, which are defined as the
errors that occur "when compliance with merger policy creates excessive costs to businesses,
enforcers, and decisionmakers"). But see Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative
Foundations ofAntitmst Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 257 (1995) (arguing that this type
of cost-benefit analysis of antitrust policy is inherently indeterminate).
141. Simplistically, an affirmative defense for intramarket second-best claims should be
adopted if
W(G58) - W(TypeOneError58) > W(TypeTwoError58) +

Admin & Litigation Costs50

where "G58" represents the universe of all "legitimate" or "good" second-best claims;
"W(G58)" equals the welfare benefits of permitting all legitimate second-best claims;
"W(TypeOneError58)" represents the welfare benefits lost when courts fail to recognize this
subset of legitimate claims; "W(TypeTwoError58)" represents the welfare loss, where courts
approve illegitimate second-best claims under the guise of the affirmative defense; and
Admin & Litigation Costs58" equals the change in administrative and litigation costs associ
ated with adopting the affirmative defense.
"

Framing the discussion in terms of a formula and defining specific variables are intended
to help conceptualize the concerns relevant to assessing the costs and benefits of a new de
fense, not to attribute any degree of mathematical certainty to the process. In particular,
W(TypeTwoError5.) is somewhat loosely defined. In addition to the illegitimate claims ac
tually litigated and mistakenly approved by the courts (classic type two errors), one must
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Market failures are common and can disrupt the functioning of
isolated industries or entire markets. Ultimately, the importance of
creating a second-best tradeoff defense is as great or as small as the
problem of unaddressed market failures that second-best solutions can
ameliorate. This includes the benefits of conduct that is encouraged
because of the defense, but does not lead to antitrust litigation, as well
as conduct that does. We cannot expect all theoretically possible gains
to be realized because some courts will not recognize valid defenses
and some parties may avoid defensible conduct because they fear mis
taken verdicts or litigation costs. At the same time, we must also rec
ognize the costs of mistakenly allowing the defense in situations where
the private conduct actually reduces total welfare. These costs should
be low initially because of the rigorous conditions that must be met to
establish the defense.142
Importantly, some number of antitrust cases raising second-best
claims will be brought and litigated regardless of whether an intra
market second-best defense is acknowledged. Currently, these cases
either ignore particular second-best concerns altogether, or raise them
under the guise of arguments that have a recognized doctrinal basis.
Examples include restraints evaluated under rule of reason, such as
R&D joint ventures and restrictions on advertising,143 but also include

account for the welfare loss associated with illegitimate conduct encouraged by the affirma
tive defense that is never challenged or litigated. There are no added administrative and
litigation costs in these cases, but, by definition, this type of conduct results in a net reduc
tion in total welfare. Similarly, in speaking of the benefits of the affirmative defense, one
must count not only those cases where welfare-enhancing conduct is challenged and upheld
under the affirmative defense, but also those cases where welfare-enhancing conduct is en
couraged by the affirmative defense but never challenged or litigated. These cases are ac
counted for in W(G58), which incorporates the positive welfare effects of all legitimate
second-best claims.
142. The capacity of the courts to administer the affirmative defense and the complexity
of the rule that is adopted will determine the frequency and magnitude of mistakes. Sub
stantive and procedural aspects of a defense can influence the likelihood and distribution of
errors. The affirmative defense outlined in this Article is intended-to create a bias in favor
of mistaken denials of the defense (type one errors). Making second-best considerations an
affirmative defense assigns the burden of proof to the defendant. Imposing a clear and con
vincing standard of evidence further ensures that the errors associated with the defense will
be mistaken denials. These hurdles and biases will reduce the likely expected benefits of the
new rule, but should also decrease the costs of the new regime. The difficulties of success
fully mounting the defense should also reduce the number of illegitimate claims brought, for
there is little sense in going to the expense of mounting the defense if it is unlikely to prevail.
Moreover, given the prospect of antitrust liability, fewer bad transactions will be undertaken
in the hope of succeeding with an illegitimate second-best defense. Legitimate claims will
also be discouraged, but their greater prospects of success means that this should happen at a
lower rate. Arguably, the conditions for successfully mounting the defense are too strict.
Once courts, enforcers, and parties become better acquainted with what is needed to estab
lish and attack the defense, it might be appropriate to relax some of the requirements, par
ticularly the burden of establishing all conditions for the defense by clear and convincing
evidence.
143. See discussion of R&D joint ventures and information market failures supra Sec
tion I.B.3.
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efforts to masquerade alleged benefits of market power as efficiency
benefits under the efficiency defense in merger cases.144
The primary effect of recognizing an affirmative defense for these
cases may be to shift resources from relatively inappropriate argu
ments under existing doctrine to relatively more appropriate argu
ments directly addressing the welfare issues that second-best concerns
raise. For example, fewer resources might be devoted justifying a
broad market definition or proving the absence of market power in
merger cases, and more might be spent proving that the conduct ad
dresses endemic market failures and for this reason will increase total
welfare.
Struggles over market definition are a flash point in most antitrust
cases. Given the important role of market-based presumptions, these
battles are often driven more by litigation strategy than theoretical dif
ferences about the correct economic market. Defendants typically
want an expanded definition of the market, and plaintiffs and regula
tors want a restrictive definition. When a party seeks to make an in
tramarket second-best defense, however, the effect will usually be to
confess market power. The result will be to shift attention and re
sources away from disputes about what the market is, to an examina
tion of the economic consequences of the behavior in question.145 Of
course, new strategic incentives will also arise, potentially leading de
fendants to argue for overly narrow economic markets. Courts can
best navigate these conflicts if they view the process of market defini
tion as an effort to establish the appropriate boundaries for a defensi
ble partial equilibrium analysis.146
The most significant effect on administrative and litigation costs
will come from those cases that would not have been brought but for
the new doctrine. One must account for the full transaction costs as
sociated with these cases. Defendants in antitrust cases bear their own
litigation expenses. The amount they are willing to spend on litigation

144.

See discussion of hospital merger cases infra note 149.

Of course, it is possible that defendants could argue both for an expansive market
definition and, in the alternative, for an intramarket second-best defense if a more narrowly
defined market is adopted. If this happens, there would be no conservation of resources.
While plausible, such litigation strategies are not without risk, and are unlikely to represent
the dominant approach.

145.

146. When the market is too narrowly defined, intermarket inefficiencies may undercut
intramarket gains. Although I have excluded intermarket second-best considerations from
the defense, largely on feasibility grounds, where during the struggle over market definition
it becomes obvious that in a plausible alternative market the welfare implications are nega
tive on balance, this could be enough to undercut the defendant's intramarket second-best
defense, even though defendants have no burden of proving that such inefficiencies do not
exist This response to the intramarket defense should be limited to plausible larger markets
so as not to encourage litigation of intermarket issues. Since plaintiffs and enforcers will
usually want to limit market size to establish market power and will still have a large incen
tive to do so, allowing this incidental assessment of larger market inefficiencies when the
larger market represents a plausible market definition should not unduly expand litigation.
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depends upon the expected profits of the underlying activity and the
probability of a successful antitrust outcome. Ideally, defendants
would make litigation decisions based on the social rather than the
private benefits flowing from their conduct, and ideally, defendants
would internalize all rather than just some of the social costs of liti
gating disputes.147 By definition, legitimate second-best claims are as
sociated with net increases in social welfare. This is conduct society
wants to allow and cases that society wants to have litigated if chal
lenged (assuming that the welfare gain exceeds the social costs of liti
gation). Unfortunately, private parties will spend no more in litigating
a claim than the expected value of the private producer surplus. To
the extent that producer surplus differs from the total welfare associ
ated with the conduct, private parties will have incentives either to
overlitigate or underlitigate these claims.148 While there is no guaran
tee that private parties will invest the socially optimum amount in liti
gation, we can at least be reassured with legitimate claims that the so
cial and private incentives are aligned in the same direction.
illegitimate second-best claims raise distinctly different questions.
These cases represent a double loss. Litigating these cases consumes
private and social resources, and to the extent that courts make mis
takes and approve these illegitimate claims, the private conduct will
further reduce social welfare. The specter of illegitimate claims justi
fies structuring the defense initially, as I have argued, in a manner that
minimizes the risk of mistakenly allowing the defense. The prospect
of mistaken victories invites private parties to engage in conduct and
defend cases that should not be defended, and provides incentives to
increase the resources invested in litigation. Reducing the risks of
mistaken defense victories minimizes both the social costs of the un
derlying welfare-impairing activity and the administrative costs of liti
gating these cases.

147. Private parties fail to internalize all the social costs of litigation. Defendants in
antitrust cases do not bear the government's costs of investigating and trying claims or the
administrative costs of the courts. Some antitrust rules counteract these effects. Damages in
antitrust cases are trebled, and defendants must pay the attorney's fees of successful private
parties. Moreover, unsuccessful defendants face the prospect of potentially burdensome
consent decrees and injunctions that could constrain prospective business conduct. These
rules could either undercorrect or overcorrect the problem. Antitrust damages and reme
dies increase the private cost of antitrust violations and deter undesirable forms of conduct,
but given the reality of type one errors, such rules can deter desirable conduct as well.
148. Private parties will underlitigate cases in which the underlying conduct increases
both producer and consumer surplus (in these cases, the increase in total welfare will be
greater than the increase in producer surplus). Private parties will have incentives to overlit
igate cases where the underlying conduct increases total welfare and producer surplus, but
decreases consumer surplus (in these cases, the increase in producer surplus will be greater
than the net increase in total welfare). If one believed that the positive welfare effects of
conduct that increases both producer and consumer surplus (conduct that would be permit
ted under both Lande's consumer surplus rule and a total welfare standard) were relatively
easier for courts to identify, then the danger associated with underlitigating these claims may
not be significant.
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The actual costs and benefits of adopting an affirmative defense
for intramarket second-best tradeoffs are not easy to quantify, and no
obvious policy recommendation falls out of this framework. If one
believes that the welfare effects of legitimate second-best claims are
substantial and that courts can successfully identify such claims, then
the case for instituting a defense is relatively strong. If one believes
that creating a defense will invite private parties to masquerade anti
competitive behavior as second-best claims and that courts \vill often
not detect such deceptions, then one should have serious reservations
about an affirmative defense. Alternatively, if one believes that courts
are already struggling with many cases that raise intramarket second
best concerns, but lack an effective framework to assess the real merits
of such cases, then an affirmative defense may be a better way than
current standards to resolve existing controversies.149 From this per
spective, the costs involved would reflect a better expenditure of ex
isting resources rather than an increase in litigation costs. My conten
tion is that the uncertainty associated with the cost-benefit analysis
does not justify inaction, but rather justifies adopting a conservative
defense that would produce information and experience to shape fu
ture policy assessments.
III. RECONCILING A TOTAL WELFARE STANDARD WITH
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE

The question of whether to allow intramarket second-best trade
offs highlights both the tension between an economically oriented an
titrust law and its statutory roots, and the tension between enhancing
total welfare (efficiency) and promoting competition as goals of anti
trust law enforcement. Among the questions to be confronted are:
Can second-best arguments be reconciled with the text and legislative
history of the antitrust laws? Are other antitrust law goals inconsis
tent with embracing a total welfare standard? Must concepts of total
welfare and efficiency yield in practice to a more structuralist agenda
of protecting a particular vision of "competition"? If the courts im
plement a total welfare standard, what is the proper balance between
static and dynamic efficiency concerns? When should courts demand
149. Hospital mergers are a persuasive example. Hospital mergers are taking place in
markets rife with market failures. Recognizing an affirmative defense for second-best claims
is unlikely to increase the number of these mergers. A second-best defense, however, would
provide a more effective framework in which to assess the merits of these cases. In its ab
sence, courts tend either to mischaracterize the lower costs from reduced nonprice competi
tion as increases in efficiency without appreciating the corresponding reduction in consumer
surplus, or to focus only on the adverse effects on consumer surplus and fail to consider the
private and social savings from conserving resources. An intramarket second-best defense
and an examination of the effects of merger on total welfare would result in better decision
making and a more effective use of litigation resources in these cases. See Hammer, supra
note 23 (providing a critical examination of the hospital merger case law).
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first-best solutions to problems in markets with substantial market
failures? How will permitting second-best solutions that enhance
market power affect the ability of private parties and legislatures to
undertake broader reform? Is an inquiry into second-best tradeoffs
consistent with the proper institutional role of the courts?
My intention here is not to resolve all of these issues but to suggest
that seeking answers to these questions should be the subject of seri
ous antitrust scholarship. Unlike Judge Bork, I do not contend that a
total welfare standard is statutorily required,150 nor that the ratification
of a total welfare standard represents the necessary or inevitable cul
mination of an economically oriented antitrust law, Rather, my con
tention is that a total welfare antitrust standard constitutes an in
creasingly "living option" under an organic approach to antitrust law
and that such a standard can be reconciled with the courts' institu
tional role. Furthermore, I argue that sound policy rationales support

150. Judge Bork advances the strong claim that, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
total welfare is the exclusive goal of the Sherman Act. According to Bork, the relevant evi
dence establishes "conclusively that the legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act was
that courts should be guided exclusively by consumer [total] welfare and the economic crite
ria which that value premise implies." Bork, supra note 21, at 11; see also BORK, supra note
12, at 50-51, 61-66. While Bork speaks of "consumer welfare," his understanding of this
term is the equivalent of what I define in this Article to mean total welfare. See discussion
supra note 21. The statutory basis for a total welfare standard has been almost universally
rejected by antitrust scholars. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 290 n.125 (1986) (criticizing
Bork's strong consumer welfare and efficiency claims); John J. Flynn, The Reagan Admini

stration's Antitrust Policy, "Original Intent" and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act,
33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 267 ("Everyone who has made a considered study of the legisla
tive history of the major antitrust laws flatly rejects Judge Bork's assertion that 'consumer
welfare' was the only goal Congress had in mind when it enacted the Sherman Act.");
Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1714, 1715 n.5 (1986) (criti
cizing similar usage of the term "consumer" in references to the legislative history); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989) ("But Bork's
analysis of the legislative history was strained, heavily governed by his own ideological
agenda. . • . Not a single statement in the legislative history comes close to stating the conclu
sions that Bork drew."); Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 250 ("Bork's work has been called
into question by subsequent scholarship showing that in 1890 Congress had no real concept
of efficiency and was really concerned with protecting consumers from unfavorable wealth
transfers."); Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side ofAntitrust: What Fairness Means and Why It
Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 273-74 (1994) (criticizing Bork's claim that consumer wel
fare is the exclusive goal of the Sherman Act); Jacobs, supra note 140, at 232-34 (discussing
and criticizing Bork's strong consumer welfare claim); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Eco
nomics, and the Courts, LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS., Autumn 1987, 181, 206-12 (discussing
and criticizing Bork's strong consumer welfare claim); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Ver
tical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 155-58 (1997) (detailing
the "populist" critique to Bork's consumer welfare claim); Millon, supra note 68, at 1231-35
(careful exposition and critique of Bork's consumer welfare claim); Rudolph J. Peritz, A
Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 282 n.72 ("Too much has already
been expended in demonstrating that Bork's account is mistaken."); see also Christopher
Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-Examination ofthe Consumer
Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359, 359 (1993) ("Congress appeared to reject con
sumer welfare. If anything, Congress seemed more concerned with producer, rather than
consumer, welfare.").

Michigan Law Review

906

[Vol. 98:849

antitrust law's evolution beyond competition into the realm of express
welfare analysis.
A.

Total Welfare: A Living Option in Antitrust
Law's Evolution

Whether a total welfare standard is a living option for antitrust law
must be determined with reference to all antitrust statutes - including
the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") and the Clayton Act
- not simply the Sherman Act. The task, however, is not to interpret
these laws in isolation, but rather to understand their provisions in the
context of the complex relationship that exists between the courts and
Congress in their joint oversight of private markets. A relational ap
proach to antitrust law envisions power-sharing between the courts
and Congress. The courts have primary responsibility for shaping an
titrust doctrine and managing its scope and orientation. Congress re
tains the authority to intervene at any time, change particular rules,
carve out areas of immunity, or impose new standards.
The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890. Substantively, the
Act speaks at a very general level, prohibiting contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade, as well as monopolization and
attempted monopolization. In spite of the volumes that have been
written about antitrust history, most scholars would concede that it is
simply not possible to divine a clear and specific mandate from either
the text or the legislative history of the law. Instead, most courts and
scholars regard antitrust as a statutorily sanctioned area of federal
common law, reflecting an organic rather than a statutory methodo
logical orientation.151 The text of the statute and the Supreme Court's

151. Most modem scholars, regardless of their substantive antitrust agendas, embrace
an organic methodological orientation. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 'Common Law' Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEXAS L. REV.
661, 663 {1982) ("To provide this flexibility, Congress adopted what is in essence enabling
legislation that has permitted a common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolu
tion guided by only the most general statutory directions."); Easterbrook, supra note 140, at
1702 ("[The Sherman Act] does not contain a program; it is instead a blank check."); id. at
1705 {"The Sherman Act set up a common law system in antitrust."); Kaplow, supra note
150, at 181, 213 ("Congress apparently contemplated a common law type of development
when it enacted the Sherman Act."); Wiley, supra note 29, at 777 ("[The Sherman Act] is
most reasonably interpreted to grant courts common law power to initiate substantive pol
icy."). This is also the orientation that has guided the Court for the last seventy years in its
interpretation of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997)
("Thus, the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less
force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected
the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradi
tions.' " (quoting National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)));
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As a charter of free
dom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be
desirable in constitutional provisions."). Standing virtually alone in their advocacy of an
antitrust doctrine grounded exclusively in statutory interpretation are Robert Bork and
Thomas Arthur. See Arthur, supra note 150, at 267 ("All the contending antitrust schools
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precedents establish parameters restricting the law's evolutionary de
velopment, but over the past one hundred years, antitrust law has
demonstrated tremendous flexibility and has been highly responsive to
changes in economic thinking and social policy. Nevertheless, appre
ciating the history of the various antitrust provisions is important to
understanding the law's different possible futures.
The FfC Act and the Clayton Act were adopted in 1914, largely in
response to the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States.152 Advocates of new antitrust legislation criticized the
"rule of reason" interpretation of the Sherman Act for being too per
missive and for not condemning many forms of objectionable anti
competitive conduct.153 Some legislators harbored institutional and
procedural concerns about the Standard Oil decision as well, believing
that the "rule of reason" was too vague and created too much discre
tion for judges.154 The response, however, was not to repeal or sub
stantively amend the Sherman Act, but to enact new antitrust regula
tions to supplement its provisions.
The Clayton Act and the FfC Act reflect different legislative
strategies. In contrast to the Sherman Act's general prohibition of
"restraints of trade," the Clayton Act prohibits specific types of con
duct - tying arrangements, exclusive dealing, and certain forms of
price discrimination.155 In addition, section 7 of the Clayton Act con
demns mergers where the effect "may be substantially to lessen com
petition, or tend to create a monopoly." In 1950, the Clayton Act was
amended to close a loophole in the original legislation.156 The 1914
agree on one critical point that the Sherman Act cannot, and should not, be given a settled
meaning derived from traditional statutory sources. They are all wrong."); Thomas C.
Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV.
1163, 1169 (1988) ("[T]he only way courts can produce stable, rational antitrust law is to re
place the constitutional approach with a statutory approach . . . .") Bork's statutory position
is outlined supra note 150.
.

152. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
153. See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 23, at 126.
154. See Arthur, supra note 150, at 291 n.132 ("[The rule of reason] substitutes the court
in the place of Congress, for whenever the rule is invoked, the court does not administer the
law, but makes the law." (quoting from a 1913 Report of the Senate Committee on Inter
state Commerce)). Iniportantly, neither the FrC Act nor the Clayton Act amended the rule
of reason announced in Standard Oil or expressly cabined the discretion of the judiciary in
applying the Sherman Act
155. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 57 (summarizing the scope of the 1914 Clayton
Act). The price discrimination provision was amended in 1936 by the Robinson-Patman
Act. The Robinson-Patman Act was intended to protect small independent retailers in the
face of growing chain stores and represents a value choice by Congress for something other
than the strict promotion of economic efficiency. Modem interpretations of the Robinson
Patman Act, however, further illustrate the transformative power of an organically oriented
antitrust methodology. See discussion infra note 174.
156. For a general discussion of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments and the circum
stances surrounding their passage, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 58-59; Bok, supra
note 2, at 226; and Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 23, at 130-42.
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provisions applied only to stock acquisitions and could easily be cir
cumvented by arranging transactions as asset acquisitions.157 Signifi
cantly, in addition to ensuring that section 7's prohibition would apply
to all mergers regardless of form, the 1950 amendments marked a
strong and renewed congressional condemnation of economic concen
tration more generally.
The 1914 FTC Act, more than the Clayton Act, adopted an ap
proach similar to that of the original Sherman Act. Rejecting propos
als for crafting a detailed list of prohibited anticompetitive acts, sec
tion 5 of the FTC Act broadly condemns "unfair methods of
competition." Power to enforce this provision was vested in a new
administrative body that could bring expert knowledge to the problem
of evaluating business conduct.158 Importantly, however, this Commis
sion was to share the function of enforcing the nation's antitrust laws
with the Department of Justice, the federal courts, and private parties
empowered to sue independently for antitrust violations. The policy
remained one of concurrent and redundant systems of enforcement.
For the first time, the FTC Act and the Clayton Act wrought the
language of "competition" into the textual fabric of the antitrust laws.
Justice Holmes's 1904 observation that antitrust law has nothing to do
with competition was no longer valid.159 Even those embracing an or
ganic approach to antitrust law must pause and consider what it means
to engage in "unfair methods of competition" or to "substantially
lessen competition." Unfortunately, there is little in the text or the
legislative history to answer these questions precisely.160 Competition
in these debates has the same flavor of "rivalry" that runs from Adam
Smith to the Sherman Act.161 Even though formal neoclassical models
of competition were well developed by 1950, these more structured

157. See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 23, at 130.
158. For a general discussion of the 1914 FfC Act and the circumstances surrounding its
passage, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 57, and Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 23,
at 107-26.
159. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes, J., dis
senting).

160. Typical of the vacuous statements in the Record is that of Representative Morgan
speaking in defense of the Oayton Act: "[T]he one thing we wish to maintain, and retain
and sustain, is competition. We want to destroy monopoly and restore and maintain compe
tition." 51 CONG. REC. 9265 (1914).
161. Classical economists understood competition in terms of "rivalry." See George J.
Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (1957)
(" 'Competition' entered economics from common discourse, and for long it connoted only
the independent rivalry of two or more persons."). This same basic understanding is re
flected in the legislative history of the Sherman Act. See Hovenkamp, supra note 150, at 23
("Althougll 'competition' was never defined formally, most of the speakers appeared to use
it to mean 'rivalry,' or the presence of multiple sellers in the market. Never once was 'com
petition' defined as a state of affairs in which price equals marginal cost, or any other meas
ure of cost.").

February 2000]

Antitrust Beyond Competition

909

understandings of competition seem hardly to have influenced the
congressional discussions. Indeed, the 1950 debate surrounding com
petition has more political than economic content.162 As Derek Bok
concluded, "it seems abundantly clear that 'competition' meant far
more to Congress than prices, costs, and product innovation."163 One
finds little additional guidance as to the meaning of competition if one
turns from the language of the law to the underlying set of legislative
policies and objectives.164
162 See Bok, supra note 2, at 236 ("To anyone used to the preoccupation of professors
and administrators with the economic consequences of monopoly power, the curious aspect
of the debates is the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects on concentration of
prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency. To be sure, there were allusions to the need
for preserving competition. But competition appeared to possess a strong socio-political
connotation which centered on the virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom
duplicated in economic literature."); Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 254.
163. Bok, supra note 2, at 248; see also Brown Shoe CO. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
315 (1962) ("The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950
amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration
in the American economy."); Bok, supra note 2, at 235-36 ("This situation was appraised in
the same Jeffersonian, egalitarian fashion by almost all who spoke for the bill. . . . In the
minds of the COngressmen, the growth of these large economic groups could lead only to
increasing government control; freedom would corrode and the nation would drift into some
form of totalitarianism." (footnote omitted)); Kaplow, supra note 150, at 211 ("[T]he 1950
amendment to section 7 of the Clayton ActO was expressly directed at social and political
aspects of economic concentration, rather than enhancing economic efficiency." (footnote
omitted)). Similar statements can be found in the debates leading up to the passage of the
original Clayton Act. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Eco
nomic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 257, 297
(1989) ("Fears of political domination by big businesses were powerfully reiterated in
congress during the 1914 Clayton Act debates, both in report language and in comments by
individual congressmen."); id. ("Senator Borah's dire 1914 warning that monopolies 'divide
our people into classes, breed discontent and hatred, and in the end riot, bloodshed, and
French revolutions.' " (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 15,955 (1914) (statement of Senator
Borah))).
164. No single, consistent purpose emerges. A number of themes are present, some
complementary, others conflicting. Robert Lande catalogues the-objectives of the FTC Act
to include improving economic efficiency, see Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 23, at 10812, protecting consumers from unfair transfers of wealth, see id. at 112-14, preventing un
ethical business practices, see id. at 115-18, curbing the social and political power of mo
nopolists, see id. at 118-19, protecting small businesses, see id. at 120-21, and providing con
sumer protection, see id. at 121-26. Lande lists the goals of the Clayton Act to include
improving economic efficiency, see id. at 131-35, protecting consumers from unfair wealth
transfers, see id. at 135-36, preventing economic concentration, see id. at 137-38, and pro
tecting small businesses, see id. at 139-40. Lande's contention that efficiency concerns were
acknowledged in the 1950 legislative debates is in tension with Bok's conclusion that "[t]here
is little basis for concluding that the achievement of lower costs as such should give rise to
favorable treatment under section 7. The possibility of lower costs was brushed aside in the
legislative deliberations and there is every reason to believe that Congress preferred the
noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to limited reductions in the cost of op
erations.'' Bok, supra note 2, at 318 (footnotes omitted). Even Lande acknowledges that
there was a striking lack of appreciation for situations in which sentiments in favor of lower
prices or against economic concentration may conflict with efficiency concerns. See Lande,
Wealth Transfers, supra note 23, at 135 n.266 ("There was apparently no explicit analysis of
the possible tradeoffs involved in implementing actions that simultaneously increase effi
ciency and raise prices to consumers.''). For a further assessment of the legislative history of
the Clayton Act that concludes that productive efficiency considerations are relevant, see

910

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:849

Ratification of an affirmative defense for intramarket second-best
tradeoffs ultimately requires the objective of total welfare to trump
structural understandings of competition. Can an organically oriented
antitrust law legitimately pursue total welfare at the occasional ex
pense of "competition"?165 While such an outcome is not dictated by
the text or the legislative history of the antitrust laws, is it precluded?
The fact that there is no rigid or even clear vision of "competition"
embedded in the text of the antitrust laws opens the door to this pos
sibility. More importantly, the courts have consistently interpreted the
various antitrust statutes in a manner that has avoided rigid structural
rules, has preserved flexibility, and has afforded the judiciary substan
tial discretion in its administration. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
condemns only "unreasonable" restraints of trade, acknowledging that
the essence of every contract is to restrain trade in some sense.166 Sec
tion 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization or attempted mo
nopolization, acknowledging that some monopolies can be acquired
and perpetuated that would not be illegal.167 Section 5 of the FTC Act
prohibits "unfair methods of competition," but rather than triggering a
new set of antitrust rules or a unique jurisprudence centered on the
concept of "competition," section 5 largely defines legality and illegal
ity in terms of the conduct that is permitted or prohibited under the
Sherman Act. "Competition," as such, has little independent signifi
cance.

Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency
REs. L. REV. 381, 393-402 {1980).

Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,

30 CASE W.

165. The tension between competition and efficiency is essentially about whether legal
presumptions based on structural understandings of competition are rebuttable. If efficiency
is the ultimate objective of antitrust law and competition is simply a proxy for determining
whether conduct is efficient, then the presumption that conduct is inefficient because it is
anticompetitive should be rebuttable by direct evidence that the conduct in question is
welfare-enhancing. See Hammer, supra note 23 (examining the ability to rebut theoretical
antitrust presumptions with the introduction of direct economic testimony). If competition
rather than efficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust law, then the presumption of illegality
predicated on the fact that conduct is inconsistent with the court's structural understanding
of competition should be irrebuttable. Under an efficiency orientation, the courts would be
able to entertain an affirmative defense predicated on intramarket second-best tradeoffs.
Under a competition orientation, such a defense may not be available.
166. There is some overstatement in this characterization of section 1. Section l's per se
rules are supposed to be the archetype of rigid categorical distinctions. Even in these rigid
categories, one can observe flexibility over time, as the hard per se rules against tying ar
rangements and group boycotts have eroded. More importantly, there is substantial flexibil
ity in characterizing behavior and therefore in deciding whether to invoke the per se con
demnation. See discussion infra note 194.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389-91 (1956); United States v. ALCOA,
148 F.2d 416, 429 {2d Cir. 1945). In addition, "monopoly conduct" is increasingly being de
fined in terms of whether there is a legitimate business justification for the action being
challenged. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985).
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The most difficult case is presented by section 7 of the Clayton
Act, which prohibits mergers that "substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly." While the Clayton Act fails to define
"competition," scholars like Derek Bok persuasively argue that the
law implicitly adopted a structural understanding of competition
similar to the economic model of pure competition with its assumed
large number of competitors. As Bok points out, "[u]nderlying the
legislative deliberations was the conviction that small business and the
dispersion of economic power are salutary and should be encouraged
by the new section 7. This premise evokes a structural theory of com
petition which stresses the advantages of larger numbers of small-sized
firms."168
Thus, the fairest conclusion is that in 1950, Congress, motivated
primarily out of basic fears of economic concentration, wanted an anti
trust merger policy that prohibited large acquisitions and that pre
served opportunity for small independent competitors. Initial judicial
enforcement of the Clayton Act was premised upon a structural un-

168. Bok, supra note 2, at 247. Hovenkamp has reached a similar conclusion. " 'Com
petition' within the meaning of the statute does not refer to a state of affairs in which prices
are driven to marginal cost and firms are encouraged to pursue all economies in production
and distribution. Rather it refers to a regime in which small businesses have a chance to
compete against larger, more efficient rivals." Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 254 (basing his
argument on a reading of the legislative history of the 1950 Cellar-Kefauver amendments).
Not surprisingly, Robert Bork provides a strikingly different definition of what "competi
tion" means. After reviewing possible definitions of competition in terms of rivalry, the ab
sence of restraint, the economist's conception of perfect competition, and the maintenance
of a fragmented industry structure, see BORK, supra note 12, at 58-60, Bork defines competi
tion "as a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating any state of affairs in which con
sumer [total] welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs through
judicial decree," id. at 61. Bork operationally defines competition as the maximization of
total welfare. In essence, Bork resolves the potential conflict between structural under
standings of competition and economic efficiency by abandoning a structural approach and
defining competition in terms of total welfare (economic efficiency). This tactic has been
criticized for failing to acknowledge competition as an intrinsic value. See Peritz, supra note
150, at 303-04 ("In short, the traditional view of competition as an important end in itself is
turned on its head: Competition is valued only when it serves wealth maximization. That is,
competition is valued only as a means for increasing the cumulative market value of private
property."); see also David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers,
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 849-53 (1989) (criticizing Bork's definitions of competition
and consumer welfare for being too narrowly focused). Others have criticized this approach
for failing to be faithful to the legislative history of the various antitrust laws and even the
common parlance of professional economists.
Economic theorists go about proving that competition produces efficiency in some circum
stances and inefficiency in others; the language by which they describe their efforts clearly
reveals that they use "competition" to describe the process of interaction (existence of ri
valry, specified in various ways) and "efficiency" to characterize the properties of the result
of many processes, of which competition is only one.
Kaplow,

supra note 150,

at

210.

Kaplow argues that the "efficiency-only interpretation also

is clearly contrary to the legislative history of all the antitrust statutes." Id.
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derstanding of competition that supported a series of presumptions
based upon levels of economic concentration.169
Section 7 represents the high-water mark for a legislatively as
serted antitrust policy predicated upon a vision of enhancing competi
tion. But its application over the years illustrates the evolutionary po
tential of antitrust law to transform its own initial understandings.
The evolution of section 7 jurisprudence reveals a steady transition
away from structural understandings of competition and towards a to
tal welfare orientation. The presumptions triggered by market share
data can be rebutted by an increasing number of factors.17° Proof of
low barriers to entry, for example, can rebut a presumption of illegal
ity, undermining the assertion that "competition" only exists when
there is a large number of active businesses.171 Additionally, the evo
lution of the "efficiency" defense under section 7 in the lower courts
reveals that structural understandings of competition are increasingly
being subordinated to broader understandings of social welfare.172
169. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'I Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 {1963) ("[A]
merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market,
and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inher
ently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evi
dence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive effects.").
170. See Hammer, supra note 23 {discussing recent cases that assert a wide range of fac
tors as being capable of rebutting the prima facie case of illegality based on market share
presumptions, including 1) ease of entry, 2) efficiency, 3) flailing company or weak competi
tor status, 4) the presence of large sophisticated buyers, 5) nonprofit status, 6) changing
market conditions, 7) direct evidence that mergers will not increase prices, and 8) promises
by the merging parties not to behave anticompetitively).
171. See, e.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 1998) ("A
court's finding that there exists ease of entry into the relevant product market can be suffi
cient to offset the government's prima facie case of anticompetitiveness."); United States v.
Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("A merger is not
likely to cause an anti-competitive effect if other participants can enter the relevant markets
and reduce the likelihood of a price increase above competitive levels."); United States v.
United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Del. 1991) ("United Tote's second argument
is that it is so easy to enter the totalistor market that high market share does not accurately
reflect an ability to exercise market power."); McCaw Personal Communications, Inc. v.
Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 1166, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The existence of low barri
ers to entry may rebut a prima facie showing of illegality, even when the combined market
shares of the merged firms is quite high.").
172 See, e.g., FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 {11th Cir. 1991) ("We
conclude that in certain circumstances, a defendant may rebut the government's prima facie
case with evidence showing that the intended merger would create significant efficiencies in
the relevant market."); Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 146-47 (entertaining
hospital's argument that efficiencies could rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects);
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1300-01 {W.D. Mich. 1996) (efficiency
gains can rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects), affd without op., 121 F.3d 708,
reported in full, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Country
Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (D. Minn. 1990) ("The Court finds these efficiencies
relevant, not so much as an independent factor justifying the proposed acquisition, but as
further evidence that the proposed acquisition will enhance competition."). But see FTC v.
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Assuming that it is a viable defense,
however, the Court cannot find in this case that the defendants' efficiencies evidence rebuts
the presumption that the merger may substantially lessen competition or shows that the
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Is the evolution of the courts' section 7 jurisprudence legitimate?173
This depends, in part, upon one's methodological orientation. It is dif
ficult to reconcile the evolution of the efficiency defense with the text
and legislative history of the Clayton Act and the 1950 Celler
Kefauver amendments, just as it would be difficult to reconcile a total
welfare standard or intramarket second-best tradeoffs with a strict
statutory orientation. Regardless of the ambiguity in the text and lack
of a precise definition of "competition," the total welfare standard I
presented in Part I does not appear to be a "living option" under a
strict statutory approach that accepts a structuralist view of section 7.
The fiction that the increases in efficiency and total welfare are "pro
competitive," while alluring, is difficult to reconcile with either eco
nomic or legislative understandings of "competition." But, as I have
just argued, antitrust jurisprudence, influenced by economic theory,
has moved beyond this. The courts have treated the antitrust laws as
organic in the sense that decisions allow for the informing of antitrust
law by economic theory so as to "grow" a body of law that is at times
increasingly independent of its original understandings.174 Under an
organic methodological orientation, the evolution of the efficiency de
fense in the lower courts can claim legitimacy. Here, it is sufficient
that the courts' interpretation is not prohibited by the statute and that
the doctrine is sound as a matter of antitrust policy, judicial adminiCommission's evidence gives an inaccurate prediction of the proposed acquisition's probable
effect.").
173. Organic approaches to antitrust must openly struggle with the question of legiti
macy of proposed doctrinal changes. Thomas Arthur has stressed this point. See Arthur,
supra note 151, at 1168 ("Thus, although the constitutional approach to antitrust raises the
same concerns of institutional competence and constitutional legitimacy, there is no coun
terpart in antitrust to the long running tempest in constitutional law over the legitimacy of
wholesale judicial lawmaking - even though it is a natural topic for inclusion in the con
tinuing debates over antitrust fundamentals." (footnote omitted)). While I agree with
Arthur that questions of legitimacy are important, I do not agree that antitrust legitimacy
must be statutorily grounded. Within an organic orientation, antitrust legitimacy is obtained
by crafting functional policies that address modem business needs in a fashion that is consis
tent with contemporary understandings of the institutional role and capacity of the courts.
174. The fate of the Robinson-Patman Act is illustrative. As originally enacted, the
anti-price discrimination provisions of the of the Robinson-Patman Act reflected a policy of
protecting small independent retailers from encroaching chain stores. As antitrust doctrine
has evolved under an efficiency mantel, the desire to safeguard competition and enhance
total welfare has largely trumped countervailing desires to protect individual competitors or
small businesses. While judges cannot overturn legislation they disagree with, the courts
have systematically narrowed the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act. Moreover, in an ef
fort to reconcile the objectives of the Act with the efficiency-oriented provisions of other
antitrust laws, courts have clearly indicated that they will not let the Robinson-Patman Act
interfere with the procompetitive mandates of antitrust law, even if this creates nearly irrec
oncilable dilemmas for businesses. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 458 (1978). In a similar move to limit the effects of the Act, the enforcement agen
cies now devote minimal resources to enforcing its provisions. For a further discussion of
the history and development of the Robinson-Patman Act, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND !TS PRACTICE § 14.6, at
571-74 (2d ed. 1999).
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stration, and the evolution of antitrust doctrine. Under this approach,
a total welfare standard and a role for intramarket second-best trade
offs remain "living options." Whether such potential should be real
ized ultimately depends upon whether an affirmative defense would
constitute sound policy and whether it could be operationalized in a
manner that can be reconciled with the courts' broader institutional
role.
B.

Total Welfare: Partnership, Legitimacy, and the Institutional Role
ofthe Courts

As stressed earlier, American antitrust law embodies a complex
partnership between Congress and the courts. What is striking if one
looks back over the past one hundred years is not that the FTC Act
and Clayton Act were adopted in 1914 and the Clayton Act amended
in 1950, but rather that there have been no successful efforts to repeal
or enact major substantive changes to the core provisions of the
Sherman Act. The dominant legislative trends have been to expand
the scope of antitrust liability, to opt for concurrent systems of en
forcement, and not to interfere with the organic evolution of antitrust
doctrine or the discretion enjoyed by courts in its enforcement.
This does not mean that Congress has been an inactive or silent
antitrust partner. Antitrust law represents a default set of rules gov
erning private markets. By express or implied repeal, Congress can
displace the antitrust regime in its entirety, with respect to either dis
crete activities or whole industries. Rather than amending or altering
the default antitrust rules, Congress is more likely to supplant antitrust
law in those areas it decides to regulate. Thus a common legislative
response has been to enact limited exceptions to the antitrust laws,
such as the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984, the McCarran-Ferguson Act ex
empting the business of insurance, the National Cooperative Research
and Production Act of 1993, the Norris-LaGuardia Act for labor, and
the Newspaper Preservation Act.
Congress is not limited to speaking through the text of its statutes.
In deciding to overrule cases or chart new directions, the Court is sen
sitive to a wide variety of legislative signals.175 The per se rule against

175. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977)
("Furthermore, Congress recently has expressed its approval of a per se analysis of vertical
price restrictions by repealing those provisions of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts al
lowing fair-trade pricing at the option of the individual States. Consumer Goods Pricing Act
of 1975, 89 Stat 801, amending 15 U.S.C. § 1, 45(a). No similar expression of congressional
intent exists for nonprice restrictions."); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 19 (1997) ("In the
context of this case, we infer little meaning from the fact that Congress has not reacted leg
islatively to Albrecht. 'In any event, the history of various legislative proposals regarding
price fixing seems neither clearly to support nor to denounce the per se rule of Albrecht.").
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resale price maintenance has not yet been overturned,
largely due to perceived congressional support for the standard. Con
gress can influence antitrust doctrine by the type of legislation it intro
duces, the hearings it holds, and the riders that it attaches to appro
priations bills.176 Moreover, antitrust enforcement priorities, policies,
and guidelines are politically influenced by the objectives of the sitting
President, as well as by the likelihood that controversial actions might
provoke new legislation.177
On their side of the partnership, the courts have embraced anti
trust as a statutorily sanctioned area of common law development,178
although there are important differences between antitrust law and
traditional common law disciplines. One is antitrust's statutory ori
gins. Ultimately, courts are constrained by the antitrust statutes, but
the ambiguities wrought into the law and the level of generality at
which the antitrust provisions speak mean that this constraint is a
loose one. A second difference is the type of sources that courts look
to in their decisionmaking. Academic scholarship179 and economic

176. In the 1980s, Congress passed a number of appropriation riders preventing the
Reagan administration's Department of Justice from advocating overruling the per se rule
against resale price maintenance announced in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See Act of Nov. 28, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97 Stat.
1102-03; Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 605, 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-73; Act of Sept.
30, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 605, 101 Stat. 1329-1, 1329-38. In 1985, Congress passed a
"sense of the Congress" resolution reaffirming the validity of the per se rule. See Act of
Dec. 13, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 99 Stat. 1169-70. Today, Dr. Miles, as it applies to
minimum resale price maintenance, is still on the books.
177. The change in enforcement agency policy in the 1994 and 1996 health care state
ments, from a strict per se treatment of joint price setting by physician networks in the ab
sence of financial risk sharing to a more liberal rule permitting joint pricing in the presence
of substantial clinical integration, was arguably influenced by fears of legislative activity. For
a discussion of the rule change, see Hammer, supra note 45. Some scholars had sharply criti
cized the 1994 statements for, among other things, the possibility that they would invite un
favorable congressional reform. See Clark C. Havighurst, Are the Antitrust Agencies Over
regulating Physician Networks?, 8 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 78, 92-94 (1996); id. at 93
("Unfortunately, unwise administration of the antitrust laws, either by the agencies or by the
courts, invites Congress to intervene on behalf of politically powerful physician interests and
to enact confusing, possibly over broad correctives or destructive immunities . . . .").
178. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 20-21; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text (ex
amining the common law orientation of antitrust law).
179. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court over
ruled the per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints that it had announced in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). A significant factor in the Court's de
cision was the amount of scholarly criticism the Schwinn rule had encountered. "Since its
announcement, Schwinn has been the subject of continuing controversy and confusion, both
in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts. The great weight of scholarly opinion has
been critical of the decision . . . ." GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47-48. Similar considerations
were cited by the Court in Khan when it overruled the per se rule against maximum vertical
price restraints announced in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). "Thus, our recon
sideration of Albrecht's continuing validity is informed by several of our decisions, as well as
a considerable body of scholarship discussing the effects of vertical restraints." Khan, 522
U.S. at 15. "Just as Schwinn was [sic] 'the subject of continuing controversy and confusion'
under the 'great weight' of scholarly criticism . . . Albrecht has been widely criticized since its
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theory180 play a greater role in the formation of modem antitrust doc
trine than in other common law areas. Similarly, the Court has con
sciously depreciated the weight of its own precedents and the role of
stare decisis in antitrust cases. "But '[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable
command.' In the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest,
well represented in this Court's decisions, in recognizing and adapting
to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experi
ence. "181
Whether the courts should adopt a total welfare standard in anti
trust cases must be examined within the context of this complex judi
cial and legislative partnership. When viewed in relational terms, as
opposed to a static question of statutory interpretation, the very role
of legislation begins to change. When Congress has acted, it has done
so to supplement rather than displace the Sherman Act. Given the or
ganic nature of antitrust's common law orientation, interventions such
as the FTC Act, the Clayton Act, and the Celler-Kefauver amend
ments can be viewed as legislative efforts to affect the trajectory of the
law's development. The lapses of time since the passage of these Acts,
as well as court decisions and executive and congressional action and
nonaction, establish new parameters on the legitimate paths of the
law's prospective growth. Indeed, some scholars have suggested an
estoppel-type theory of statutory interpretation should be applied to
the antitrust laws.182 From this perspective, the persuasive power of
specific legislative enactments can decay over time, and the freedom
of courts to experiment with new doctrines in response to contempo
rary needs can increase, while the legislature is continually free to re
intervene.
inception."

48).

Khan, 522 U.S.

at 21 (citation omitted) (quoting

GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47-

180. In GTE Sylvania, the Court indicated that economic notions of competition would
have to take primacy over political or sociological constructs of competition. "Competitive
economies have social and political as well as economic advantages, but an antitrust policy
divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks." GTE Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 54 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)). The
Court examined the economic rationality of a variety of vertical nonprice restraints and
found them to be meritorious. "[T]here is substantial scholarly and judicial authority sup
porting their economic utility. There is relatively little authority to the contrary." GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58 (footnote omitted). The Court conducted a sinillar economic
analysis in Khan. "After reconsidering Albrecht's rationale and the substantial criticism the
decision has received, however, we conclude that there is insufficient economic justification
for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing." Khan, 522 U.S. at 18. Interest
ingly, the Court made this determination on a review of the case law and the literature, and
without the solicitation of expert economic testimony at the district court level. See Khan,
522 U.S. at 19.
181. Khan, 522 U.S. at 20 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 {1991) (altera
tion in original)).

182 See Wiley, supra note 29, at 777 n.299 ("Congress in turn has cooperated with this
allocation of policy responsibility. It has accepted the bulk of the Court's antitrust inven
tion.").
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The treatment of economic efficiency in merger cases from the
1950s to the present is consistent with this understanding. The 1950
Celler-Kefauver amendments reflected a strong congressional concern
with economic concentration and an implicit hostility to claims of pro
ductive efficiency - at least to the extent that increased efficiency was
correlated with increased size. The passage of these amendments was
a substantial development in antitrust history and represented a con
certed legislative effort to affect the trajectory of antitrust's evolution
ary growth. The Court was responsive and gave substantial weight to
the law's underlying deconcentration policies in shaping antitrust doc
trine in the 1960s (inside and outside the merger context). Legality
under section 7 was defined in rigid structural terms. Mergers were
condemned at their "incipiency" at relatively low levels of economic
concentration, and the Court responded to alleged efficiency claims in
a hostile manner.183
Much has changed since then. Merger analysis has become far less
rigid as economic considerations have increased the sophistication
(and complexity) of the analysis.184 The thresholds at which anticom
petitive effects are assumed have increased. The Court has embraced
economic efficiency as a positive virtue in other areas of antitrust law,
and the lower courts are increasingly recognizing efficiency arguments
as potential defenses in Clayton Act section 7 cases.185 Rather than
viewing these developments as a repudiation of the Celler-Kefauver
amendments, which they might well have been had they occurred in
the immediate wake of the law's passage, these developments can be
seen as rational adaptations to changing circumstances, including pol
icy signals sent by the legislature. These changes obtain their legiti
macy through the persuasiveness of their underlying justifications, the
length of time they endure, and the acquiescence of the legislative
branch. Moreover, it can be argued that the degree of common law
freedom the judiciary possesses to adopt new antitrust approaches to
old questions increases with the novelty of new demands, improve
ments in economic and judicial understandings of the consequences of
merger, and the rate at which contrary legislative interventions decay.
It is within this environment that the issue of intramarket second-best

183. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966) ("Congress
sought to preserve competition among many small businesses by arresting a trend toward
concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to the point that a market was
left in the grip of a few big companies."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346
(1962) ("We cannot avoid the mandate of Congress that tendencies toward concentration in
industry are to be curbed in their incipiency . . . ."). The merging grocery stores in Von's
Grocery had a combined 7.5% share of the L.A. market See Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 272.
184. See, for example, DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 130, for a descrip
tion of contemporary enforcement agency approaches to assessing the legality of horizontal
mergers.
185.

See cases cited supra note 172.
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tradeoffs and the broader question of the welfare orientation of anti
trust law need to be assessed. Given antitrust developments in the
past twenty-five years, I believe that an affirmative defense recogniz
ing intramarket second-best concerns is within the scope of acceptable
evolutionary paths of antitrust law and is thus a living option for
judges and antitrust policymakers.
Antitrust doctrine, however, must be concerned not only with the
absolute capacity of the courts but also with the relative strengths and
weaknesses of private parties, courts, Congress, and the enforcement
agencies to address the problem of market failures. Many antitrust
rules serve implicit channeling functions, dictated as much by institu
tional needs as by legislative mandate. Antitrust rules help define a
division of labor between private markets and public institutions, be
tween Congress and the judiciary, and between administrative regula
tion and the courts. In this process, Congress and the courts have
formed a partnership with antitrust law establishing the default rules
that govern private µiarkets. In the absence of express federal or state
regulation, these rules are administered at the discretion of the judicial
system.
The challenge, therefore, is to articulate a vision of intramarket
second-best tradeoffs and a total welfare standard that can be opera
tionalized within this partnership and that can create a workable divi
sion of labor between the legislative, enforcement, and judicial func
tions. Under a total welfare standard, courts are given the task of
maximizing welfare on a market-by-market basis. This is a defensible
default rule for policing private markets. A total welfare standard
does not give the courts unlimited discretion. By adopting an eco
nomic orientation and by limiting analysis to intramarket concerns,
two important tasks are channeled out of the courts to the legislative
body. The first task is establishing priorities for extra-economic objec
tives and making tradeoffs between economic and extra-economic
goals. The second task is making tradeoffs between distinct economic
markets. Conceptually, these functions are better suited to the fact
finding and deliberative capacity of a legislative body.
Antitrust rules must also create an appropriate division of labor
between spheres of public and private activity. The affirmative de
fense for intramarket second-best tradeoffs creates a forum in which
welfare-enhancing solutions to market failures can emerge from either
the public or the private realm. Current antitrust doctrine tends to
discourage private initiatives that could ameliorate the consequences
of market failures, biasing potential solutions in a public direction.
For example, hospitals may seek to merge so that they do not have to
spend money wastefully on amenities such as private parking spaces
for physicians, but the law may not allow them to effectuate such sav
ings by concentration. Adopting a total welfare antitrust standard and
acknowledging intramarket second-best tradeoffs open the door for
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private initiatives. Since antitrust law only establishes a set of default
rules, state and federal regulators are free to displace private initia
tives.186 Moreover, the focus of the third element of the affirmative
defense on dynamic efficiency is designed to approve private initia
tives in a manner that will not impair or substantially increase the cost
of subsequent public or private initiatives. The result is a system that
encourages innovation and maintains flexibility by permitting a wide
range of responses to market failures.
Intramarket second-best tradeoffs address market failures occur
ring in a single economic market.187 The internal logic of second-best
theory, however, naturally extends beyond intramarket tradeoffs to
embrace potential intermarket considerations as well. Is it appropri
ate to limit antitrust law to partial equilibrium analyses (focusing on a
single well-defined market), even as the antitrust mandate is expanded
to consider tradeo·ffs between market power and other failures in the
same market? Maintaining a judicial focus on intramarket concerns
can be justified on both practical and theoretical grounds. To begin
with, the intra- and intermarket distinction is not exogenously deter
mined. Market definition is the first step in most antitrust cases.
Proper market definition seeks to include the full range of products
that are acceptable consumer substitutes, as well as an appropriate
range of supply substitutes. In many instances the boundaries estab
lished in this process can capture interrelated market failures.188 Mar186. State or federal legislatures may intervene because they believe a public solution
would be more efficient, or because they favor a different social outcome. The prospect of
polluters or cigarette manufacturers reaping monopoly profits may strike many as offensive
and inappropriate. These outcomes can be avoided by legislation without having to con
demn second-best tradeoffs more generally.
187. Of course, this distinction assumes that it is meaningful to speak of "markets" as
discrete, definable entities. In theory, as well as in practice, the boundaries separating mar
kets are often porous, and general second-best theory highlights the frequently artificial na
ture of antitrust market definition. This tension is not dissimilar to the considerations an
economist confronts in deciding whether to employ a partial or a general equilibrium
framework to model economic phenomena, or in defining the appropriate scope of partial
equilibrium analysis.
188. The discussion supra note 146 was concerned about private parties manipulating
the market definition process. Private parties might have incentives to define markets too
narrowly to exploit an intramarket second-best defense that may in fact lead to a net welfare
loss in a more properly defined market. The concern here is slightly different. It is possible
for intermarket second-best problems to undercut the asserted efficiency of intramarket
second-best solutions. As a matter of good policy and good economics, courts should strive
to use the market definition process as a tool to capture strong economic interrelationships.
If market definition is used to correctly frame the economic inquiry, then the claim that
maximizing efficiency within such a partial equilibrium context will lead to an increase in
total welfare is economically defensible. See Williamson, supra note 17, at 987 {arguing that
the general theory of second best need not undermine the viability of a partial equilibrium
antitrust analysis, so long as the partial equilibrium framework captures strong interconnec
tion); see also William J. Baumol, Informed Judgment, Rigorous Theory and Public Policy,
32 S. ECON. J. 137, 143-45 {1965) {discussing the ability to partition economic inquiries in a
manner that captures dominant second-best considerations); discussion supra notes 15-18
and accompanying text.
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ket definition aside, private economic activity often embodies, is
shaped by, or reflects the existence of market failures in a manner that
ensures that economic interconnections are brought before the court
as a package. For example, externalities or other market failures may
shape firm contracting and integration practices or be the subject of
trade association rules and policies.
Given the partnership between Congress and the courts, the
intra/intermarket distinction need not be perfect to be functional.
Every antitrust theory must struggle with defining the proper institu
tional role of the courts and the appropriate division of labor between
Congress, the enforcement agencies, and the judiciary. The task of
developing policies and strategies for policing intermarket second-best
concerns can properly be relegated to Congress, both because the
analysis strains the boundaries of what can be litigated in court,189 and
because intermarket tradeoffs increasingly involve policy choices that
are better suited to the political process (comparisons between apples
and oranges held by distinctly different constituencies as opposed to
comparisons between apples and apples).190

189. Antitrust policy must be sensitive to the limitations of judicial capacity. Part II ar
gued that the theoretical and applied economic tools necessary to implement a partial equi
librium economic analysis exist and can be made intuitively accessible to judges and jurors in
assessing intramarket second-best tradeoffs. This claim is not equally valid for general equi
librium analysis and intermarket second-best claims. If an affirmative defense for second
best concerns is successful in an intramarket setting, however, there is nothing to prevent
broadening consideration to certain intermarket tradeoffs at a future date.
190. A theoretical concern still remains. This is the looming specter of the general the
ory of second best. Is it defensible to rely upon allocative efficiency as a basis for decision
making after acknowledging the significance of intramarket second-best tradeoffs? One of
the primary lessons from Lipsey and Lancaster's seminal work is the caution against "piece
meal welfare economics." Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 7, at 17. Given the existence of
multiple market failures, correcting isolated market failures is not necessarily welfare
enhancing. Partial equilibrium analysis can start to unwind once the existence of market
failures elsewhere in the economy is acknowledged. One could easily paraphrase Lipsey and
Lancaster to say that in the presence of multiple market failures, there is no guarantee that
maximizing total welfare on a market-by-market basis will necessarily lead to an increase in
social welfare. My answer at this point will not be satisfying for those who seek to leverage
Lipsey and Lancaster's insight into a full-scale reworking of contemporary antitrust analysis.
See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text {discussing Markovits's critique of allocative
efficiency as a basis for antitrust analysis). In the end, my continued acceptance of allocative
efficiency and the partial equilibrium framework as a basis for policymaking is premised on
the belief that a properly constructed partial equilibrium analysis, and a decision rule that
seeks to maximize total welfare, will capture most of the tradeoffs of first-order significance
and will lead to more defensible results than the current antitrust rule that seeks either to
minimize market power or to maximize "competition." This fact, in conjunction with the
incorporation of dynamic efficiency concerns into the intramarket second-best defense and
the express acknowledgment of an institutional partnership with the legislature to address
intermarket tradeoffs, makes me comfortable with the limited second-best analysis advo
cated here.
Other defenses could also be mounted. Melvin Reder outlines the Chicago School's vi
sion of general equilibrium analysis as a functioning research agenda. See Melvin W. Reder,
Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 11-13 {1982). Core as
sumptions of research agendas are seldom questioned, at least by those inside the paradigm.

February

2000]

Antitrust Beyond Competition

921

Finally, the antitrust enforcement agencies could play an important
role in developing an intramarket second-best defense. Enforcers
could acknowledge the relevance of second-best concerns, even if
courts do not adopt the defense. Enforcement agency guidelines have
been influential in shaping antitrust law in the past. The arguments
developed in this paper suggest that the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission should seriously consider incorporating
second-best concerns in subsequent guidelines and should more ex
pressly acknowledge the role that total welfare analysis plays in anti
trust law. Moreover, just as the enforcement agencies have been on
the vanguard of developing and implementing the tools required to
assess the unilateral effects of merger, the agencies could use those
same techniques to refine their assessments of the welfare implications
of restraints more generally. This would further develop the economic
techniques and sophistication required for implementing a second-best
defense. In addition, the enforcement agencies would be wise to con
sider the implications of second-best theory in deciding how best that is most in the public interest - to allocate their enforcement re
sources, and in deciding which cases to prosecute. Even a strong be
lief that antitrust law has a particular statutory vision of competition
should not prohibit the enforcement agencies from considering total
welfare effects in allocating their limited enforcement resources.
C.

Total Welfare: Moving Antitrust Law Beyond Competition

A workable antitrust policy must be capable of functioning in the
hands of enforcement agency officials deciding which antitrust prob
lems to prosecute, of judges and jurors resolving antitrust disputes
brought before them, and of lawyers counseling clients regarding what
conduct is and is not likely to violate the antitrust laws. A total wel
fare standard provides a more workable antitrust orientation than

Within the Chicago School view, examples of market power and market failure are viewed
as limited in scope. In the long run, they do not undermine the assertion that "prices of fac
tors are good approximations to the opportunity cost of using them." Id. at 15. "Market
failure or more generally failure of individual decision makers to achieve a Pareto-optimum,
is treated like monopoly, an unusual situation, to be analyzed ad hoc but not requiring a shift
of emphasis away from the basic competitive model." Id. at 16. From this perspective, cor
recting intramarket second-best tradeoffs could be an appropriate part of the research
agenda, while addressing intermarket second-best tradeoffs would not. William Baumol
mounts a more pragmatic defense. Baumol attempts to avoid the policy paralysis implicit in
second-best theory by arguing that (1) many of the interdependencies may be sufficiently
limited to permit effective partitioning of the market, (2) many policy problems are suffi
ciently pressing that some action must be taken even if there might be unforeseen and nega
tive secondary consequences, (3) policies leading to welfare improvements may be justified
even if they do not produce optimality, and (4) the economic theory of second best must
contend with the political reality that comprehensive reforms are seldom politically avail
able, forcing the need for a series of partial solutions. See Baumol, supra note 188, at 143-45.
Still, Baumol cautions that policy advisers who casually ignore problems of second best do so
"at the public's peril." Id. at 145.
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does the existing competition-based approach. In making this asser
tion, I envision a total welfare standard as an evolutionary extension
of the present competition-based framework. Most of the legal pre
sumptions about anticompetitive conduct would be retained. The im
portant difference would emerge in cases where economic facts call
these presumptions into question.
Competition-based antitrust policies embrace structural under
standings of what competition means and proceed to reject, as "anti
competitive," conduct that is inconsistent with that understanding.
The problem with this approach is that competition is ill defined.
Most understandings of competition (historical or contemporary) do
not provide an apparatus sufficient to support a comprehensive anti
trust policy. The classical conception of competition as rivalry, for ex
ample, falls short of the mark. It does not tell us how much rivalry is
appropriate or what type of rivalry is desirable. In the name of rivalry
should we allow competitors to torch each other's business? Moreo
ver, the heart of any workable antitrust policy is the ability to strike an
appropriate balance between cooperation and rivalry. An inherent
limitation of competition-based orientations is that they address only
one side of this equation.
Some courts have attempted to fill this void with a more developed
neoclassical understanding of competition. An industry is perfectly
competitive if there exist large numbers of buyers and sellers acting
independently. "Large numbers" can be operationally defined by the
inability of any single buyer or seller to affect market price (each pro
ducer faces a perfectly elastic firm-specific demand curve). One pitfall
of this approach is the tendency to lose the larger picture and focus
too closely on the effect the alleged anticompetitive conduct has on
individual competitors. This pitfall can be avoided by repeating the
admonition that antitrust laws are designed to protect competition and
not competitors, and by recalling that the appropriate focus is not on
the fate of individual firms, but rather on whether those firms re
maining will have any ability unilaterally to influence price or output.
This insight reflects an important refinement of the structural un
derstanding of competition. The presence of large numbers of buyers
and sellers is important only as evidence from which it can be inferred
that there is no market power. Competition can be understood as
more functional than structural. It can be defined as the absence of
producer discretion over price (reminiscent of the statement that pro
ducers in competitive markets are price takers and not price makers).
If the focus is on the absence of individual firm discretion, then it
makes sense to investigate not only the constraints imposed by exist
ing competitors but also the constraints posed by potential competi
tors. From this perspective, it is possible to envision a market that is
"competitive" yet has only a handful of functioning firms. The lesson
is one that is already well recognized in antitrust law: large numbers
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need not be the hallmark of competition, so long as there are no sub
stantial barriers to entry.191
This is a richer and more textured understanding of how markets
work, but the fact remains that even this more functional definition of
competition breaks down as a guide to policy in important cases.
These are cases in which cooperation is more beneficial than rivalry,
and where economies of scale or scope are substantial. How should a
competition-based antitrust policy address Williamson's merger that
creates real market power and real welfare gains? There may be a
small number of post-merger competitors, and the very nature of the
technology generating the efficiencies may be the source of substantial
barriers to entry. Alternatively, how should a competition-based pol
icy address cooperative R&D joint ventures, or joint industry
standard-setting in the face of imperfect information? When courts
encounter these problems, they frequently slip into forms of analysis
that are more consistent with a total welfare standard, even if they at
tempt to retain the rhetoric of competition.
Under contemporary doctrine, restraints of trade can be justified if
the restraints are "procompetitive," but what does it mean to be "pro
competitive"? Which justifications will this standard permit and which
will it disallow? The answers that the Court often gives mark a depar
ture from structural understandings of competition. Conduct is pro
competitive if it increases output, reduces price, or enables the parties
to provide a product or service that would not otherwise be avail
able.192 It is easier to reconcile these criteria with a total welfare stan
dard than with a competition-based standard. Courts will permit con
duct and agreements that might otherwise be viewed as restraints of
trade, if the parties can establish that the conduct will result in a net
increase in total welfare. Within this framework, evidence of an in
crease in output, a reduction in price, or the introduction of a new
product most often indicates an increase in social welfare, regardless
of the impact of the conduct on competition. By the same token, these
factors do not constitute an exhaustive list of ways to demonstrate an
increase in total welfare.
I do not advocate abandoning either the infrastructure of competi
tive analysis or the series of legal presumptions that have been built on
its foundation. In a vast number of cases, a structural understanding
of competition serves as an effective proxy for separating welfare-

191. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984)
(proof of ease of entry into a market can rebut a prima facie case of illegality based upon
high market shares under section 7); see also cases cited supra note 171 (discussing barriers
to entry).
192 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102-04 (1984) (defining "pro
competitive effects" in terms of the ability to widen consumer choices, introduce a new
product, or increase output); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
18-23 (1979) (examining the "procompetitive" effects of Bl\1I's blanket licenses).
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enhancing (efficient) from welfare-destroying (inefficient) behavior.
Furthermore, I generally favor heuristic devices and appropriate pre
sumptions drawn from competitive theory. The presumptions of le
gality and illegality based upon market definition and concentration
ratios in section 7 cases are generally defensible. Similarly, the pre
sumptions of illegality for most of the categories of conduct consid
ered per se illegal are also defensible.
I would build upon this structure by explicitly acknowledging that
structural concepts of competition are used only as a proxy to deter
mine the ultimate issue of whether conduct is efficient (welfare
enhancing). Hence, I would make these presumptions rebuttable even in what now are per se cases. A party could rebut a presumption
of illegality if it could demonstrate (by clear and convincing evidence)
that the underlying conduct produced an increase in total welfare. In
varying degrees, district and appellate courts are already doing this
when they consider an efficiency defense in section 7 merger cases.193 I
believe that the Supreme Court is also implicitly doing this now in
Sherman Act section 1 cases when it decides whether or not to invoke
the per se rule or consider conduct under the rule of reason.194 While
preserving the rhetoric of competition, the Court is developing a sub
stantive body of antitrust principles more consistent with a total wel
fare standard. A number of the examples discussed in Section I.B.3
illustrate how courts are addressing market failure concerns under the
rule of reason. Once these trends are acknowledged, it is a short step
to applying the same logic and analysis to intramarket second-best
tradeoffs.
Taking this step beyond competition to express welfare analysis is
important. A welfare orientation dovetails better with the reasoning
underlying most private business transactions and lays the foundation
for more effective client counseling. Often, the most effective ques
tion in. antitrust counseling is, "Why do you want to do this deal?" or
"What benefits do you expect and who will receive them?" While in
practice, I felt comfortable telling clients that if they were confident
that they could convince a group of lay outside observers that their
conduct was "efficient" in the sense that it would produce net social
193.

See cases cited supra note 172 (efficiency defense in section 7 cases).

194. Compare, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (declaring
per se illegal the territorial divisions underlying the efforts of small independent grocers to
market their own private label brand), with NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-04 (holding that the
NCAA's collectively bargained television contract, which lintited the aggregate number of
games broadcast and prohibited member schools from independently marketing their own
games, must be examined under the rule of reason); compare also Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-55 (1982) (holding efforts by physicians to collectively
negotiate terms and rates with third-party payors to be a per se illegal price fixing conspir
acy), with Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8-10, 24 (holding that the joint efforts of composers
to negotiate blanket licenses was price fixing only in a "literal" sense and would be evaluated
under the rule of reason).
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benefits, then it was unlikely that the conduct would violate the anti
trust laws. Although this welfare analysis serves as a good predictor of
likely antitrust outcome, it is not a good predictor of the likelihood of
a government challenge or the ultimate cost or length of litigation. In
stead, the degree to which the conduct conforms with traditional con
ceptions of "competition" is a better predictor of the likelihood of
challenge, the stage at which the dispute would be resolved, as well as
the total litigation costs. Reforming antitrust law under a total welfare
banner would help resolve this tension and realign antitrust outcomes,
the likelihood of challenge, and the cost of proceedings in a more ra
tional and consistent manner.
CONCLUSION

Intramarket second-best claims present an interesting puzzle: the
paradox of "anticompetitive" conduct that may be welfare-enhancing.
The problem highlights tensions between economic and noneconomic
approaches to antitrust law, as well as tensions between different eco
nomic approaches, by driving a wedge between "competition" and
"efficiency" as guiding principles. There are many parallels between
second-best concerns and Oliver Williamson's productive efficiency
defense. Thirty years ago, Williamson outlined a four-step process for
the evolutionary adoption of an efficiency defense for horizontal
mergers.195 The first step was acknowledging efficiencies as a matter
of principle, even if disallowed as a practical matter. The second step
was the introduction of efficiency-related evidence for explanatory
completeness, to understand the full context in which the merger takes
place. The third step was litigating efficiencies as an actual defense in
limited types of mergers. The final step was the introduction of an ef
ficiencies defense more generally, as dictated by accumulated theory
and practical experience. In this analysis, Williamson applied many of
his own theories of institutional economics to the evolution and devel
opment of antitrust doctrine.196 Three decades later, this analysis has
proven to be prophetic. Accomplishing the first and perhaps second
steps would be a substantial victory for intramarket second-best
tradeoffs, presenting an opportunity for antitrust law to move beyond
structural concepts of competition and to take the next logical step in
its evolutionary development.

195.

See Williamson, supra note 2, at 113-14.

196. See id.; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 272-81
{1987) (outlining an evolutionary approach to the incorporation of economic theory into
antitrust law that stresses the importance of legal process over legal rules in shaping antitrust
doctrine).

